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Big Censorship in the Big House—
A Quarter-Century After Turner v. Safley:
Muting Movies, Music & Books Behind Bars
Clay Calvert*
Kara Carnley Murrhee†
ABSTRACT
On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Turner v. Safley, this Article examines how federal courts across the country are
applying the Turner standard today in cases involving the First Amendment free speech
rights of inmates. Are courts too quick today to support the censorial proclivities of
prison officials? Do judges too readily capitulate in deference to the concerns of those
tasked with overseeing the incarcerated? Those are the key questions this Article
addresses by analyzing inmate access to magazines, movies, books, and other common
forms of media artifacts. This Article’s determinations stem from opinions rendered in
2010 and 2011 at both the federal appellate and district court levels.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court is currently busy analyzing First Amendment1
cases affecting individuals’ access to supposedly harmful or otherwise offensive media
content. For instance, in June 2011, the Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari2 to
consider whether the Federal Communications Commission’s “current indecency-
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1
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech
and Free Press Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 613 F.3d 317 (2nd Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.Ct. 3065 (2011)
(No. 10-1293).

	
  

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2012

enforcement regime violates the First or Fifth Amendment3 to the United States
Constitution.”4 The same day it chose to hear the dispute over broadcast indecency,5 the
Supreme Court struck down a California law limiting minors’ access to violent video
games,6 ruling that the state failed to prove the law satisfied the rigorous strict scrutiny7
standard of judicial review.8 Previously, in United States v. Stevens,9 the high court
declared unconstitutional on overbreadth10 grounds a federal statute11 criminalizing “the
commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty.”12
While such high-profile battles are waged before the Supreme Court,13 dozens of
First Amendment fights involving the ability of inmates to access media content like
3

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3065 (2011).
5
The FCC defines indecent content as “language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or
excretory organs or activities.” Guide: Obscenity, Indecency and Profanity, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/guides/obscenity-indecency-and-profanity (last visited May 8, 2012).
6
Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); see CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1746 (2010) (defining the
key terms of the law, including “violent video game”); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1746.1 (2010) (providing, in
relevant part, that “[a] person may not sell or rent a video game that has been labeled as a violent video
game to a minor”); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1746.2 (2010) (requiring that “[e]ach violent video game that is
imported into or distributed in California for retail sale shall be labeled with a solid white ‘18’ outlined in
black”).
7
See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (opining that a content-based
regulation of speech “can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny,” and explaining that “[i]f a statute
regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government
interest”); see also Joel Timmer, Violence as Obscenity: Offensiveness and the First Amendment, 15
COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 28 (2010) (explaining that “[l]aws restricting such content generally are subjected to
strict scrutiny, the standard typically applied to content-based restrictions on fully protected speech” and
that “[u]nder strict scrutiny, the government must show that a restriction is necessary to achieve a
compelling government interest and that the restriction is narrowly drawn to achieve that end”).
8
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738–39 (holding that “California cannot meet that standard” because, in large part,
it could not “show a direct causal link between violent video games and harm to minors” and because any
effects that could be shown “are both small and indistinguishable from effects produced by other media”).
9
130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
10
See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (providing that under “our First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech”);
see also Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2008) (providing an
excellent analysis of overbreadth within the context of criminal statutes); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and
Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915 (2011) (examining misconceptions and
misunderstandings about facial challenges, including overbreadth).
11
After the United States Supreme Court declared the statute in question, 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2009),
unconstitutional in United States v. Stevens, Congress quickly amended it by adopting the Animal Crush
Video Prohibition Act of 2010. See Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-294, 124
Stat. 3177 (2010) (amending 18 USCA § 48 and defining an animal crush video as “any photograph,
motion-picture film, video or digital recording, or electronic image that (1) depicts actual conduct in which
[one] or more living non-human [animals] is intentionally crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, impaled,
or otherwise subjected to serious bodily injury . . . and (2) is obscene” violating a criminal prohibition on
cruelty to animals under federal law or the law of the state in which the depiction is created, sold,
distributed, or offered for sale or distribution).
12
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1582.
13
Each of the three cases described in the first paragraph may be considered “high profile” due to the
mainstream news media coverage it generated. For instance, when the Supreme Court ruled in Brown, the
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magazines and movies behind bars flew largely under the mainstream news media’s radar
in 2011.14 These cases centered on a myriad of cultural media artifacts, such as: 1) a
quarterly magazine called Crime, Justice & America distributed to county jail inmates in
California;15 2) a Japanese-style, comic-book magazine called Shonen Jump depicting
cartoons children watch on television;16 3) a D.H. Lawrence book called Divas and
Lovers—The Erotic Art of Studio Manassé featuring portraits from the 1920s and 1930s
era of cinema and cabaret in Vienna;17 4) a prison policy that uses the ubiquitous Motion
Picture Association of America’s rating system to help determine what movies inmates
are allowed to watch;18 5) the ability of inmates to play video games on conventional
gaming systems including Xbox Elite, Play Station 3, and Wii;19 6) the efforts of a free
man to mail a prisoner a compact disc set entitled Dylan Thomas: The Caedmon
decision was reported on the front pages of major newspapers across the United States. See, e.g., Robert
Barnes, Limits on Video Games Rejected, WASH. POST, June 28, 2011, at A1 (reporting on Brown as
“striking down as unconstitutional California’s attempt to ban the sale of violent games to minors”); Joan
Biskupic, Ruling Puts Regulation in Game Designers’ Control, USA TODAY, June 27, 2011, at 1A
(heralding the decision in Brown as “groundbreaking” and asserting that it “represents a landmark moment
for the gaming industry and lifts a threat to its creative development”); Bob Egelko, Violent Video Game
Ban Doomed by Free Expression Concerns, S.F. CHRON., June 28, 2011, at A1 (reporting on the Brown
decision); Adam Liptak, Minors Can Buy Violent Games, Justices Decide, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at
A1 (reporting on the decision and calling it the “latest in a series of rulings protecting free speech, joining
ones on funeral protests, videos showing cruelty to animals and political speech by corporations”); David
G. Savage, State’s Law on Video Games Voided, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at A1 (reporting that “the
Supreme Court ended its term with a vigorous defense of free speech, striking down a California law that
banned sales of violent video games to minors and effectively shielding the entertainment industry from
any government effort to limit violent content”).
14
See infra Part II (addressing these cases).
15
Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 656 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2011). According to its website, the magazine is:
a quarterly 40-page mainstream magazine about the criminal justice system [that] is distributed
free to the county inmates in nearly 70 counties in 13 states including California, Nevada,
Washington State, Arizona, Florida, Illinois and more. Since 2002, we have published 15 different
editions and over 1,200,000 copies! Crime, Justice & America magazine has provided not just
desired, but sorely needed information to the newly arrested in the local criminal justice systems.
About CJA, CRIME, JUSTICE & AMERICA, http://crimejusticeandamerica.com/aboutcja (last visited May 8,
2012).
16
Kaden v. Slykhuis, 651 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2011); see also WEEKLY SHONEN JUMP ALPHA,
http://shonenjump.viz.com (last visited May 8, 2012) (providing the website for this popular manga
magazine). Manga comic books, which are typically printed in black and white, are read back-to-front and
“look more like cheap paperbacks than traditional comics.” Maja Beckstrom, Manga Mania, SAINT PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 24, 2005, at 1E. See Matthew Price, Japanese Graphic Novel Tops Charts in U.S.,
OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 19, 2004, at 16D (describing Shonen Jump as “an anthology magazine featuring
popular comics aimed primarily at boys and young men”).
17
Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing D.H. LAWRENCE, DIVAS AND LOVERS: THE
EROTIC ART OF STUDIO MANASSE (Margot Bettauer Dembo trans. 1998)).
18
Avila v. Cate, No. 1:10-cv-01208, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73809 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (considering
the use of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) rating system). The MPAA rating system
seeks to provide “basic information to parents about the level of various elements in the film, such as sex,
violence and language so that parents can decide what their children can and cannot see,” and adding that
“they help protect the freedom of expression of filmmakers and this dynamic American art form.” What
Each Rating Means, MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, http://www.mpaa.org/ratings/what-eachrating-means (last visited May 8, 2012).
19
Graham v. Sharp, No. 10-5563, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66675 (D. N.J. June 20, 2011).
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Collection20 featuring “Thomas reading his poetry and prose, and also [a] reading of
some of his favorite writers, including W.H. Auden and William Shakespeare”;21 and 7)
an inmate’s ability to subscribe to “lad magazines”22 including Maxim,23 Stuff, and
FHM.24
Although these disputes may seem petty, trivial or insignificant for the nonincarcerated, the reality is that millions of Americans—particularly minorities25—are
affected by the suppression of speech behind bars. The Baltimore Sun, for example, noted
in an August 2011 editorial that “[t]he United States contains just 5 percent of the world’s
population, yet its prisons house nearly a quarter of all the people incarcerated around the
globe. We imprison our citizens at a greater rate than any other country.”26 California
alone had more than 143,000 inmates in its state system that same month.27
In his recent book, Texas Tough: The Rise of America’s Prison Empire, Robert
Perkinson writes that one of every thirteen Hispanics in the United States has been
incarcerated and, even more dramatically, one of every six African-American males.28
Perkinson adds that “a generation after the triumphs of the civil rights movement, African
Americans are incarcerated at seven times the rate of whites, nearly double the disparity

20

North v. Clarke, No. 3:11-cv-211, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84917 (E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2011). In February
2012, United States District Judge James R. Spencer granted inmate Owen North’s motion for summary
judgment and concluded that a Virginia Department of Corrections’s policy that prohibited all secular, nonmusic CDs was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and thus violated the First
Amendment. North v. Clarke, No. 3:11-cv-211, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15204 (E.D. Va. Feb. 7, 2012).
21
Dena Potter, Louisiana Man Sues Virginia Prison System After Denial of Literary CD, VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Apr. 5, 2011, at B3. A recent article in the Library Journal describes the collection in which:
the Welsh poet uses his wonderfully rich and tactile voice to read his poetry, as well as the lovely
A Child’s Christmas in Wales and a selection of other works. The recordings, the earliest of which
was made in 1952, have just enough reverb to evoke turn-of-the-century microphones à la The
King’s Speech. Part of Caedmon’s remarkable series of poets reading their own work, this
collection gathers a number of different recordings that feature Thomas’s extraordinary musical
voice.
Neal Wyatt, The Reader’s Shelf; Story Hour: Authors Read Their Own Works, LIBRARY J., Sept. 1, 2011, at
139.
22
See Charles McGrath, How Hef Got His Groove Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at MM 24 (observing
that “for a while Playboy appeared to have been crowded off the newsstands by the so-called lad
magazines—Maxim, Stuff, FHM and the like,” and adding that “[o]f the major lad mags, only Maxim still
stands, and one of its former editors, 36-year-old Jimmy Jellinek, two years ago became editorial director
of Playboy”).
23
Maxim has been described as featuring a “mixture of scantily clad B-list starlets, college-fraternity humor
and useful information on gadgets, clothes and other preoccupations of young, affluent men.” Lorne Manly,
A Lad Mag and a Brand in Las Vegas, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2006, at C1.
24
DePuente-Hudson v. Adams, No. 1:08-cv-01228, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16421 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18,
2011).
25
See infra notes 28–29 and accompanying text (presenting data regarding the incarceration of minorities
in the United States).
26
Editorial, Downsizing Maryland’s Prisons, BALT. SUN, Aug. 14, 2011, at 20A.
27
See Marisa Lagos, Moving Inmates Won’t Be Enough, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 6, 2011, at A1 (noting that
California “appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled in May that California must cut the number of
prisoners from 143,500 to 110,000 by 2013”).
28
ROBERT PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S PRISON EMPIRE 2 (2010).
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measured before desegregation.”29 George Mason University Professor Roger Lancaster
recently observed that:
Starting in the 1970s, lawmakers across the United States enacted punitive
“lock ’em up” policies. The prison population more than quadrupled, and
the United States became first in the world in both the total number of
prisoners (about 2.3 million) and the rate of imprisonment (1 of every 100
adults is behind bars).30
At the end of 2011, the total population of federal inmates was slightly more than
218,000.31 This figure has increased steadily over the past dozen years, with the Federal
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) having a total inmate population of fewer than 165,000 in fiscal
year 2001—a figure that rose to slightly more than 208,000 during fiscal year 2009.32
While the current economic crisis in the United States may soon force some states
to cut their prison budgets and, in turn, their prison populations,33 that is scant relief for
those now incarcerated. In brief, the First Amendment speech rights of about one out of
every 100 adults34 are affected by the judiciary’s behind-bars jurisprudence. Ultimately,
as David L. Hudson, Jr., of the First Amendment Center writes in profoundly understated
fashion, “prisoners—whatever they have done—are still human beings worthy of some
level of respect.”35
Are courts too quick today to support the censorial proclivities of prison officials?
Do judges too readily capitulate to the concerns of those tasked with overseeing the
incarcerated? Those are the key questions this Article addresses on the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s critical ruling in Turner v. Safley,36

29

Id. at 3.
Roger N. Lancaster, Op-Ed., Sex Offenders: The Last Pariahs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, at SR6.
31
Federal Prison System FY 2013 Budget Request at a Glance, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE 2,
available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013summary/pdf/fy13-bop-bud-summary.pdf (last visited Feb.
21, 2012); see also Inmate Population, Quick Facts About the Bureau of Prisons, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp#1 (last visited Dec. 8, 2011). The data made available by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons are updated each month; the data reflected in this Article are from the Bureau of
Prisons’s figures as of October 29, 2011, that were publicly available on December 8, 2011.
32
Federal Bureau of Prisons, State of the Bureau 2009: The Bureau’s Core Values, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
2, available at http://www.bop.gov/news/PDFs/sob09.pdf (last visited Feb. 20. 2012).
33
See Krissah Thompson, Group Presses States to Cut Prison Spending, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2011, at A2
(reporting that “[a]dvocates of overhauling the U.S. criminal justice system see a bright spot in the dire
financial straits that states are facing: Politicians eager to trim budgets are willing to cut spending on
prisons and corrections programs”).
34
Lancaster, supra note 30, at Opinion 6.
35
David L. Hudson, Jr., Why I Care About Prisoner Rights, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (May 25, 2011),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/why-i-care-about-prisoner-rights. Hudson explains this point by
quoting the late Justice Thurgood Marshall for the proposition that “[w]hen the prison gates slam behind an
inmate, he does not lose his human quality; his mind does not become closed to ideas; his intellect does not
cease to feed on a free and open interchange of opinions; his yearning for self-respect does not end; nor is
his quest for self-realization concluded.” Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974)
(Marshall, J., concurring)).
36
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
30
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which largely provides the judicial lens through which restrictions on inmates’ speech
rights are analyzed.37
Part I provides an overview of the United States Supreme Court’s framework for
examining First Amendment access-to-speech disputes involving incarcerated
individuals.38 Importantly, Part I also reveals a rift among the current justices on the
standards that should be applied to inmate cases, with Justices Clarence Thomas and
Antonin Scalia subscribing to a novel approach they have twice endorsed in concurring
opinions.39
Part II then analyzes eight federal court decisions from 2010 and 2011 affecting
inmates’ access to popular forms of media content, paying particular attention to the
amount of deference (or lack thereof) courts grant to prison officials’ reasoning and
rationales for behind-bars censorship.40 Next, Part III questions and criticizes the
assumptions courts seem to make about the harms that certain media products will cause
or create within prison environments.41 It juxtaposes those assumptions with other areas
of First Amendment jurisprudence in which a much more rigorous analysis of the
causation-of-harm question is mandated. Finally, the Article concludes in Part IV by
arguing that the odds are slim to none that a prisoner in an access-to-speech controversy
will prevail today under Turner without a particularly outrageous and egregious set of
facts or without having the fortune of drawing a decidedly pro-free speech jurist.42
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S FRACTURED FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK FOR
EVALUATING THE SPEECH RIGHTS OF INMATES
The last time the United States Supreme Court squarely addressed a case involving
the First Amendment right of inmates to access media content was more than five years
ago, back in 2006 in Beard v. Banks.43 Beard centered on a Pennsylvania prison policy
that prohibits the most “specially dangerous and recalcitrant inmates”44 from accessing
any newspapers and magazines.45 Under the policy, the only media content these inmates
may possess are “legal and personal correspondence, religious and legal materials, two
library books, and writing paper.”46
Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the judgment of the Court in a plurality opinion
joined by three justices47 and with which another two justices concurred in the result.48
37

See infra Part I (providing an overview of Turner and the other Supreme Court-fashioned frameworks for
analyzing restrictions on the constitutional rights of inmates).
38
Infra notes 43–112 and accompanying text.
39
Infra notes 74–90 and accompanying text.
40
Infra notes 113–332 and accompanying text.
41
Infra notes 333–347 and accompanying text.
42
Infra notes 348–359 and accompanying text.
43
548 U.S. 521 (2006).
44
Id. at 525.
45
See id. at 526 (noting that, under the policy at issue for prisoners in Level 2 of Pennsylvania’s Long Term
Segregation Unit, inmates “have no access to newspapers, magazines, or personal photographs”).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 524 (noting that Justice Breyer announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in
which Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Anthony Kennedy and David Souter joined).
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Justice Breyer explained that the basic, substantive principles governing the case were
rooted in the Court’s 1987 opinion, Turner v. Safley,49 and its 2003 decision, Overton v.
Bazzetta.50 Drawing from and synthesizing these two prisoner-rights cases, Breyer made
clear that: 1) prisoners do possess First Amendment speech rights;51 2) those rights,
however, are not the same as those possessed by non-incarcerated individuals;52 3)
substantial deference must be granted to prison officials when evaluating restrictions on
prisoners’ rights;53 and 4) the constitutional rights of prisoners may be permissibly
abridged if the regulations are reasonably related to legitimate penological concerns.54 A
fifth point is important here—the burden “is not on the State to prove the validity of
prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.”55 In brief, the incarcerated face an
uphill battle of both burden and deference when attempting to disprove the
reasonableness of a restriction on their First Amendment rights.
In determining reasonableness of the alleged penological concerns asserted by
prison officials, Justice Breyer reiterated a four-factor test established twenty-five years
ago in Turner: 1) “there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;” 2) whether
inmates possess alternative means and avenues of exercising the right in question; 3) the
affect that accommodating the asserted constitutional right will have on guards, other
inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and 4) whether there are “obvious, easy
alternatives” to censorship that can accommodate “the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost
to valid penological interests” or, in contrast, whether there is an “absence of ready
alternatives.”56
The Turner test amounts to a very relaxed form of judicial scrutiny57—the Court
calls it a “reasonableness standard,”58 in stark contrast to strict scrutiny.59 Professor
Giovanna Shay asserts that Turner “emphasizes deference to prison officials and the

48

See id. at 536–42 (Thomas, J., concurring) (setting forth the concurring opinion of Justice Clarence
Thomas, which was joined by Justice Antonin Scalia).
49
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
50
539 U.S. 126 (2003).
51
See Beard, 548 U.S. at 528 (explaining that “[t]his Court recognized in Turner that imprisonment does
not automatically deprive a prisoner of certain important constitutional protections, including those of the
First Amendment”).
52
See id. (writing that “the Constitution sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights in a prison than
it would allow elsewhere”).
53
See id. (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 132, for the proposition that “courts owe ‘substantial deference to
the professional judgment of prison administrators’”).
54
Id.
55
Overton, 539 U.S. at 132.
56
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987) (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
The Court made it clear in Turner that, on this fourth reasonableness factor, prison officials need not
exhaust all possible options, writing that “prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every
conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Id.
57
See Matthew D. Rose, Prisoners and Public Employees: Bridges to a New Future in Prisoners’ Free
Speech Retaliation Claims, 5 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 159, 160 (2009) (observing that Turner “established a
very deferential rational basis standard of review”).
58
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409 (1989).
59
See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing the strict scrutiny standard).
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relative technical and administrative expertise of corrections authorities.”60 Indeed, as
Professor Christopher Smith notes, “[p]risoners seldom prevail when judges apply the
Turner test.”61
Turner also closely tracks the exceedingly limited press freedom given to public
high school students who write for and edit their school-sponsored newspapers.62 In brief,
both minors on campus and adults behind bars are treated as second-class citizens. As
David Hudson points out, the similarity in treatment the two groups receive in First
Amendment jurisprudence, just one year after Turner was decided, the United States
Supreme Court ruled in the student-speech case of Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier63 “that school officials could censor student speech if their actions were
‘reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’ The Court simply substituted the
word ‘pedagogical’ for ‘penological.’ When I lecture on this substitution to student
groups, there normally is a collective gasp.”64
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explained in Turner the reasons for such slackened
review in inmate cases:
Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible
strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration. The rule would also distort the
decisionmaking process, for every administrative judgment would be
subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that
it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand.65
Applying this test in Beard, the plurality concluded that prison officials had
adequately justified the need for the newspaper and magazine access ban imposed on
only the most dangerous and recalcitrant inmates.66 In reaching this conclusion, Justice
60

Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 341 (2009).
Christopher E. Smith, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Corrections Law, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 477,
491 (2009).
62
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that “educators do not offend
the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns”) (emphasis added); see also Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and in Prison, 85
WASH. L. REV. 71, 73 (2010) (asserting that “judicial opinions about freedom of speech compare schools
and prisons without irony, and indeed without hesitation. Courts litter their decisions about prisoner speech
with citations to decisions about student speech and vice versa. Many judges treat the analogy as if it were
innately persuasive”); Alana M. Sitterly, Silencing Death Row Inmates: How Hammer v. Ashcroft Needs a
Rational Basis for Its Rational Basis, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 323, 327 (2011) (observing that
“[f]ree speech restrictions in prisons can also be examined through the lens of similar restrictions in public
schools. While free speech rights in public schools do not mirror those within prisons, similar legal
considerations underlie both institutions”).
63
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
64
Hudson, supra note 35.
65
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
66
Justice Breyer wrote:
While we do not deny the constitutional importance of the interests in question, we find, on the
basis of the record now before us, that prison officials have set forth adequate legal support for the
61
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Breyer noted that Pennsylvania offered several reasons for the prohibition “including the
need to motivate better behavior on the part of particularly difficult prisoners, the need to
minimize the amount of property they control in their cells, and the need to ensure prison
safety, by, for example, diminishing the amount of material a prisoner might use to start a
cell fire.”67 Breyer found that the first of these justifications—providing increased
incentives for inmates to rehabilitate their behavior by depriving them of media content—
was adequate to support the ban and he went no further into the other interests.68 The
ostensible incentive for good behavior, under the Pennsylvania policy, is that positive
conduct eventually leads to “somewhat less severe restrictions, including the right to
receive one newspaper and five magazines.”69 Justice Breyer thus reasoned that “[t]he
articulated connections between newspapers and magazines, the deprivation of virtually
the last privilege left to an inmate, and a significant incentive to improve behavior, are
logical ones.”70
The plurality’s analysis in Beard has been criticized for effectively “reducing the
four [reasonableness] factors to one.”71 Indeed, Justice Breyer wrote that “the second,
third, and fourth factors, being in a sense logically related to the Policy itself, here add
little, one way or another, to the first factor’s basic logical rationale.”72 He added that:
The real task in this case is not balancing these factors, but rather
determining whether the Secretary [of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections] shows more than simply a logical relation, that is, whether he
shows a reasonable relation. We believe the material presented here by the
prison officials is sufficient to demonstrate that the Policy is a reasonable
one.73
But the Court’s 2006 plurality decision in Beard v. Banks also reveals a fissure
among the justices regarding the legal standard under which to evaluate deprivation of
rights behind bars. Specifically, Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion
that was joined by Justice Antonin Scalia.74 Thomas and Scalia rejected the Breyer
plurality’s deployment of the Turner test and, instead, endorsed a standard that Justice
Thomas had framed in his earlier concurrence in Overton v. Bazzetta, calling it “the least
perilous approach for resolving challenges to prison regulations, as well as the approach
that is most faithful to the Constitution.”75
policy. And the plaintiff, a prisoner who attacks the policy, has failed to set forth “specific facts”
that, in light of the deference that courts must show to the prison officials, could warrant a
determination in his favor.
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006).
67
Id. at 530.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 526.
70
Id. at 531–32.
71
Sanford L. Bohrer & Matthew S. Bohrer, Just the Facts, Ma’am—Determining the Constitutional Claims
of Inmates to the Sanctity of Their Legal Mail, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893, 900 (2009).
72
Beard, 548 U.S. at 532.
73
Id. at 533.
74
Id. at 536–42 (Thomas, J., concurring).
75
Id. at 537 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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In Overton, Justice Thomas was again joined by Justice Scalia in an opinion
concurring in the judgment.76 Justice Thomas wrote that “[s]tates are free to define and
redefine all types of punishment, including imprisonment, to encompass various types of
deprivations—provided only that those deprivations are consistent with the Eighth
Amendment.”77
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,”78 and it applies to
states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.79 The United States
Supreme Court recently observed that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
“prohibits the imposition of inherently barbaric punishments under all circumstances”80
and represents “the essential principle that, under the Eighth Amendment, the State must
respect the human attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes.”81
In Overton, Justice Thomas wrote that “[t]he only provision of the Constitution that
speaks to the scope of criminal punishment is the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
of the Eighth Amendment.”82 Importantly, and with regard to restrictions imposed on a
prisoner once he or she is incarcerated, Justice Thomas reasoned that “[s]entencing a
criminal to a term of imprisonment may, under state law, carry with it the implied
delegation to prison officials to discipline and otherwise supervise the criminal while he
is incarcerated.”83 He emphasized that “a sentence encompasses the extinction of a
constitutional right enjoyed by free persons turns on state law, for it is a State’s
prerogative to determine how it will punish violations of its law, and this Court awards
great deference to such determinations.”84
For Beard’s ban of newspaper and magazine access, Justice Thomas’s standard
examined “whether Pennsylvania intended to confer upon respondent and other inmates a
right to have unfettered access to newspapers, magazines, and photographs.”85 He
initially determined that Pennsylvania had impliedly delegated to prison officials, as part
of the sentencing process, the ability to enforce “rules and disciplinary measures set forth
by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.”86 Put more simply, such regulations are
incorporated into prison sentences.87
Justice Thomas’s Eighth Amendment test is even more deferential to prison
officials than the Turner standard used by Justice Breyer and the plurality in Beard. As
one commentator observed, the deference granted under Justice Thomas’ standard
“exceeds the grant of deference by the plurality and grants absolute deference to states
and prison officials to entirely eliminate constitutional rights with only the Eighth
76

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 138–45 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring).
78
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
79
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (noting that the Eighth Amendment “is applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment”).
80
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010).
81
Id.
82
Overton, 539 U.S. at 140 (Thomas, J., concurring).
83
Id. (emphasis added).
84
Id.
85
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 538 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring).
86
Id.
87
See id. (writing that “these regulations are included in the prison sentence”).
77
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Amendment as a limit.”88 Thomas’s view may constitute what Professor Christopher
Smith dubs a “novel assertion,”89 but his view was shared by Justice Scalia, who joined
with Thomas in both Overton and Beard. It is, ultimately as Professor Smith writes
elsewhere, “an extraordinarily limited view of prisoners’ rights.”90
Beard included two dissents—one authored by Justice John Paul Stevens and
joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,91 and one penned by Justice Ginsburg.92 These
dissents provide some hope for the future of prisoners’ speech rights, despite the fact that
Justice Stevens retired and thus is no longer on the Court. As with Justice Breyer’s
plurality opinion, Justice Stevens also found that Turner provided the correct standard
under which to analyze the magazine and newspaper access ban.93 In applying that test,
however, Justice Stevens seemed to appreciably ratchet up the level of review,94 while
adding several healthy doses of dicta that certainly can be considered pro-prisoner
rights,95 such as characterizing Pennsylvania’s newspaper and magazine ban as coming
“perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control.”96
Justice Stevens expressed more than a little skepticism at the incentive-throughdeprivation rationale—Pennsylvania’s holding back of all newspapers and magazines,
with the down-the-road promise of access to them if a prisoner behaves better97—that the
88

Jennifer N. Wimsatt, Note, Rendering Turner Toothless: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Beard v.
Banks, 57 DUKE L.J. 1209, 1225–26 (2008).
89
Smith, supra note 61, at 496.
90
Christopher E. Smith, The Changing Supreme Court and Prisoners’ Rights, 44 IND. L. REV. 853, 869
(2011).
91
Beard, 548 U.S. at 542–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92
Id. at 553–56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg wrote that while she joined “Justice Stevens’
dissenting opinion in full, I direct this separate writing to the plurality's apparent misapprehension of the
office of summary judgment” Id. at 553.
93
Id. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (writing that “[w]hen a prison regulation impinges upon First
Amendment freedoms, it is invalid unless ‘it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests’”)
(quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
94
See infra notes 97–105 and accompanying text.
95
For instance, Justice Stevens opined that “the rule at issue in this case strikes at the core of the First
Amendment rights to receive, to read, and to think.” Beard, 548 U.S. at 543 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Typically, one might expect to find such language about core First Amendment rights in a case addressing
limitations on political speech, not prisoner access to media products. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC,
130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (holding that “[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to
protect it”).
Justice Stevens reasoned that “the complete prohibition on secular, nonlegal newspapers,
newsletters, and magazines prevents prisoners from ‘receiv[ing] suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas,’ which are central to the development and preservation of individual identity, and
are clearly protected by the First Amendment.” Beard, 548 U.S. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Certainly
such dictum taps directly into the theory of self-realization and self-fulfillment through expression. See C.
Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978)
(writing that speech must be protected not only “as a means to a collective good but because of the value of
speech conduct to the individual”); Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in
America, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 960 (2004) (writing that “free speech is valuable because it promotes and
reflects human personality and is an essence of human dignity. Autonomy to think, listen, and speak for
oneself is essential to a free and self-determining human being”).
96
Beard, 548 U.S. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97
Supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (describing this incentives-based approach).
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plurality readily accepted. Justice Stevens explained that Pennsylvania’s “deprivation
theory of rehabilitation,”98 which is premised on the notion that “[a]ny deprivation of
something a prisoner desires gives him an added incentive to improve his behavior,”99
involves “no limiting principle; if sufficient, it would provide a ‘rational basis’ for any
regulation that deprives a prisoner of a constitutional right so long as there is at least a
theoretical possibility that the prisoner can regain the right at some future time by
modifying his behavior.”100 Stevens thus concluded that a reasonable fact finder could
find that Pennsylvania’s measured an “an exaggerated response”101 to its otherwise
legitimate interest in rehabilitation.
Justice Stevens also questioned another of Pennsylvania’s justifications, namely
that magazines and newspapers constitute flammable material that a prisoner might use to
start a fire in his cell.102 Observing that the prisoners affected by the ban in question
already possess a large number of materials in their cells that could be used to start a
fire,103 Justice Stevens reasoned that “it does not follow, as a matter of logic, that
preventing inmates from possessing a single copy of a secular, nonlegal newspaper,
newsletter, or magazine will have any measurable effect on the likelihood that inmates
will start fires, hide contraband, or engage in other dangerous actions.”104 To buttress this
assessment, Justice Stevens pointed to the factual record which actually contradicted this
justification, as the deputy superintendent of the Pennsylvania prisons made it clear
during a deposition that “inmates could engage in any of the behaviors that worried
prison officials without using banned materials.”105
Finally, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg penned a dissent seconding Justice Stevens’
analysis, writing that “Stevens comprehensively explains why the justifications advanced
by the Secretary of Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections do not warrant pretrial
dismissal of Ronald Banks’s complaint alleging arbitrary deprivation of access to the
news of the day.”106 Adding her own examples of the blatant inconsistencies with
Pennsylvania’s newspaper-deprivation policy—inconsistencies that Justice Ginsburg
found made it arbitrary and irrational under Turner107—she noted that “[t]he regulation
denies The Christian Science Monitor to inmates housed in level 2 of the prison’s longterm segregation unit but allows them The Jewish Daily Forward, based on the
determination of a prison official that the latter qualifies as a religious publication and the

98

Beard, 548 U.S. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 552.
102
Id. at 543–44.
103
In particular, each inmate is provided with:
a jumpsuit, a blanket, two bedsheets, a pillow case, a roll of toilet paper, a copy of a prison
handbook, ten sheets of writing paper, several envelopes, carbon paper, three pairs of socks, three
undershorts and three undershirts, and may at any point also have religious newspapers, legal
periodicals, a prison library book, Bibles, and a lunch tray with a plate and a cup.
Id. at 543–44.
104
Id. at 544.
105
Id. at 545.
106
Id. at 553 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107
Id. at 555.
99
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former does not.”108 She wryly observed that “[p]risoners are allowed to read Harlequin
romance novels but not to learn about the war in Iraq or Hurricane Katrina.”109
Each of the opinions in Beard demonstrates the unsettled nature of free-speech
rights behind bars: some justices apply Turner very deferentially, while others apply it
much more rigorously, and still other justices—namely, Clarence Thomas and Antonin
Scalia—reject the Turner test altogether in favor of an Eighth Amendment standard.110
Further, liberal-leaning Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan had not yet joined the
Court when Beard was decided, leaving one to wonder if they might join fellow female
and liberal-tilting Justice Ginsburg in applying a tighter form of Turner review as she did
in her Beard dissent. Conversely, Justice Samuel Alito, a nominee of President George
W. Bush111 who has found himself isolated from all of his colleagues on the Court in
several recent cases involving controversial forms of expression,112 also was not on the
Court that heard Beard. Might Alito align himself with fellow conservative and male
Republican appointees Justices Thomas and Scalia to endorse an Eighth Amendment
approach?
Such differences of opinion within Beard, along with a mix of new justices who
have yet to express their own views about free speech behind bars while on the high
court, leaves lower court judges with many possible directions to turn today when
evaluating restrictions on inmates’ access to media content like books, magazines and
movies.
II. THE STATE OF FREE SPEECH & MEDIA CONTENT BEHIND BARS: AN ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS FROM 2010 AND 2011
This Part of the Article first examines a quartet of federal appellate court cases
from the past two years involving restrictions on common forms of media content behind
bars.113 It then analyzes four federal district court decisions from the same period
addressing similar issues.114 In the process, this part demonstrates the often vast
deference accorded to prison officials and the steep, uphill battle that inmates must
surmount when fighting for their First Amendment rights to access magazines, movies,
music, and other popular forms of media materials.
While there were numerous other federal court decisions rendered in 2010 and
2011 involving the free speech rights of inmates,115 the ones scrutinized below were
108

Id.
Id.
110
Supra notes 74–90 and accompanying text (describing Justice Thomas’s relevant concurring opinions
and his Eighth Amendment standard).
111
See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited May 8, 2012) (noting that Alito was
nominated to the Court by President George W. Bush).
112
Justice Alito authored solo dissents in the crush-video case of United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577
(2010), and in the Westboro Baptist Church funeral-protest case of Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207
(2011).
113
See subpart II.A.
114
See subpart II.B.
115
More than fifteen other cases were decided by federal courts at both the district court and appellate court
levels during this time period. See infra Appendix for examples from this list.
109
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chosen for analysis by the authors in part because they cover a wide range of fact patterns
and in part because they illustrate differing levels of deference to Turner a quartercentury after it was decided by the high court. Eight opinions in total were also selected
for purposes of parsimony, lest this article become too lengthy. Readers are encouraged
to review for themselves the other 2010 and 2011 decisions not examined in detail
here.116 The authors did not examine First Amendment-based claims regarding religious
reading materials, which raise additional Free Exercise Clause concerns.
A. Federal Appellate Court Opinions
1. Deprivation of Sexually Explicit Materials
In February 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
Sperry v. Werholtz117 rejected an inmate’s First Amendment-based civil rights
challenge118 to a Kansas Department of Corrections’ (KDOC) policy providing that “[n]o
inmate shall have in possession or under control any sexually explicit materials, including
drawings, paintings, writing, pictures, items, and devices.”119 Sperry, an inmate at the
Lansing Correctional Facility who was forced to dispose of ten to twelve adult magazines
in order to comply with the regulation,120 was initially rebuffed in his free-speech dispute
in May 2010 when the trial court granted summary judgment for defendant Roger
Werholtz, secretary of the KDOC.121 Nine months later, following the trial court’s lead in
applying the Turner standard,122 the appellate court affirmed summary judgment, largely
adopting and often quoting the lower court ruling.123 In doing so, the appellate court
engaged in a very deferential form of review.124 It accepted Werholtz’s affidavit that the
blanket ban, which applied to all inmates, not merely those who were sex offenders,125
served multiple penological goals.126
The goals stated by Werholtz included: 1) protecting institutional security because
“[s]exually explicit materials can lead to the open performance of lewd acts”127 and
because the very act of possessing such content might be used by some inmates to
identify gay prisoners who are frequent targets of violent attacks;128 2) helping to treat
116

See infra Appendix (listing those opinions and providing a brief parenthetical for each that describes the
key underlying facts and the judicial outcome).
117
413 Fed. Appx. 31 (10th Cir. Feb. 14, 2011).
118
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010) (providing remedies for “an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress” for individuals deprived of civil rights by any person acting “under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia”).
119
Sperry, 413 Fed. Appx. at 34.
120
Id. at 33.
121
Sperry v. Werholtz, No. 04-3125-CM2010, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49116 (D. Kan. May 18, 2010).
122
Sperry, 413 Fed. Appx. at 39–42.
123
Id. at 42.
124
Infra notes 132–137 and accompanying text.
125
See Sperry, 413 Fed. Appx. at 41 (using the term “blanket ban” to describe the policy).
126
See id. at 40 (writing that “[w]e agree with the district court that the governmental objectives underlying
Kansas Administrative Regulation § 44-12-313 are legitimate and neutral and that the regulation is
rationally related to those objections”).
127
Id. at 40.
128
Id. at 41.
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and manage sex offenders because, without a ban applicable to all inmates, non-sex
offenders might trade sexually explicit material with sex offenders;129 and 3) mitigating
possible sexual harassment complaints by prison staff who had previously “complained
about being required to view these materials while performing their duties”130 and who
alleged that inmates had openly compared them to individuals depicted in the sexual
content.131 Collectively, this trio of justifications boils down to security, treatment, and
fear of litigation.
The fear-of-litigation justification certainly seems tenuous because it is not a fear of
lawsuits filed by inmates but rather lawsuits brought by the very people who are charged
with watching them. If censorship of speech can be justified by the possible reaction that
government officials—prison security guards—might have to the speech, then censorship
is a certain result. This justification has nothing to do with either protecting or treating
prisoners but has everything to do with protecting the government from expensive
lawsuits.
The Tenth Circuit’s deference to and relaxed application of Turner was evident at
several points in Sperry. For instance, in applying the first of the four Turner factors—
namely, whether a valid and rational connection exists between the regulation and the
asserted legitimate governmental interest—the appellate court wrote that prison officials
are not required to prove either that the banned materials previously caused problems or
that they are likely to result in future problems.132 The Tenth Circuit stressed that
“empirical evidence is not necessarily required”133 and that “[t]he only question that we
must answer is whether the defendants’ judgment was ‘rational,’ that is, whether the
defendants might reasonably have thought that the policy would advance its interests.”134
The Tenth Circuit also made it clear that two items are irrelevant in this analysis: 1)
whether or not the regulation on sexually explicit material actually advances any of the
purported government interests; and 2) whether the court disagrees with the policy
itself.135
In perhaps the most glaring form of deference, the Tenth Circuit refused to strike
the assertions in the affidavit of KDOC Secretary Werholtz despite acknowledging that
“paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the affidavit are very conclusory in terms of showing a rational
connection between the ban on sexually explicit materials and the asserted penological
interests of prison security, prevention of sexual harassment, and treatment of sex
offenders.”136 Rather than strike these paragraphs, the appellate court merely “urge[d]
prison officials to be more thorough and specific in future cases.”137 Viewed cynically,
this seems somewhat akin to a “we’ll let you get away with it this time, but don’t push us
again” approach that reflects a very relaxed review of governmental justifications for
intrusions on the free speech rights of inmates.
129

Id.
Id.
131
Id.
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Id. at 40.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 39 n.4.
137
Id.
130

	
  

271

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2012

Finally, adding monetary injury to First Amendment insult, the appellate court
closed its opinion by reminding Jeffrey Sperry, a pro se plaintiff and appellant, that he
needed to continue to make partial payments on his appellate filing fee until it was paid in
full.138 A dozen adult magazines and filing fees later, Sperry had lost his property and
case, with the appellate court seconding the district court’s lead in applying a very
deferential form of the Turner test.
2. Dangerous Fantasies? Dispossessed of Dungeons and Dragons
Gang activity behind bars probably is not the first thing that comes to mind when
one thinks of the role-playing game Dungeons and Dragons (D & D),139 but that was the
concern that animated the dispute in Singer v. Raemisch.140 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Singer upheld a regulation at Wisconsin’s Waupun
Correctional Institution that banned possession of D & D materials, such as books and
magazines about the game, and prohibited inmates from playing D & D.141 The January
2010 ruling affirmed summary judgment for prison officials142 and came as a blow to
plaintiff Kevin Singer,143 whom the appellate court described as a long-time and devoted
D & D player. 144
For several years prior to the ban, he had “frequently ordered D & D publications
and game materials by mail and had them delivered to his cell.”145 Singer’s role-playing
fantasy behind bars came to a crashing halt, however, after the prison’s disruptive group
coordinator received an anonymous letter expressing “concern that Singer and three other
inmates were forming a D & D gang and were trying to recruit others to join by passing
around their D & D publications and touting the ‘rush’ they got from playing the
game.”146 In what might cynically be considered as the height of overreaction to D & D
spawned by an anonymous letter, Bruce Muraski, the facility’s expert on gangs, testified
in seemingly irony-free fashion that he decided to “check into this gang before it gets out
138

Id. at 42.
See Leonore Fleischer, Treasure in the Dungeon, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1980, at Book World 15
(describing D & D as “a role-playing fantasy game that transforms ordinary youngsters into treasurehunting elves, dwarves, magic-users, halflings and fearless fighters,” and adding that it “is just as popular
on college campuses where sophisticated advanced players map out game strategies on their math
departments’ already overloaded computers. Even 10-year-olds use their pocket calculators when playing
D&D”).
140
593 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2010).
141
Id. at 531 (affirming summary judgment for prison officials).
142
United States District Judge J. P. Stadtmueller granted summary judgment for the defendants of Singer’s
First Amendment claims in July 2007. See Singer v. Frank, No. 05-C-1040, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55663,
at *64 (E.D. Wis. July 31, 2007) (concluding that “after applying the Turner factors, the plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the policy at issue in this case was
reasonably related to the legitimate penological interests of maintaining safety and security and curbing
gang activity”).
143
Singer, according to one newspaper report on the case, “is in prison serving a life sentence for
bludgeoning and stabbing his sister’s boyfriend to death.” Just Because Someone Looks Mostly Dead, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Jan. 27, 2010, at 6A.
144
Singer, 593 F.3d at 532.
145
Id.
146
Id.
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of hand.”147 Apparently for Muraski, D & D players are equivalent to members of the
violent, national-level Bloods148 and Crips149 gangs.150 Thus, less than one month after
Muraski received the letter, Singer was forced to give up possession of twenty-one books
and fourteen magazines about D & D, as well as a ninety-six page, handwritten
manuscript about D & D that Singer had penned.151
Just what is D & D? In an article in the American Journal of Psychotherapy that
explored how D & D was used by a young man with an obsessional, schizoid personality,
Dr. Wayne Blackmon explained that D & D is:
an imagination game. Worlds are created and the participants play
characters in this imaginary world. Each player’s character is created
according to a set of rules that govern abilities and classes of characters.
Through complicated series of dice rolls, a character is dealt strength,
intelligence, wisdom, dexterity, constitution, and charisma. The types of
characters are clerics, dwarves, elves, fighters, halflings, magic users or
thieves.152

147

Id. (emphasis added).
An April 2008 report to Congress, prepared by the United States Department of Justice, describes the
Bloods as:
an association of structured and unstructured gangs that have adopted a single gang culture. Large,
national-level Bloods gangs include Bounty Hunter Bloods and Crenshaw Mafia Gangsters.
Bloods membership is estimated to be 5,000 to 20,000; most members are African American
males. Bloods gangs are active in 123 cities in 37 states. The main source of income for Bloods
gangs is retail-level distribution of cocaine and marijuana. Bloods members also are involved in
transporting and distributing methamphetamine, heroin and, to a much lesser extent, PCP
(phencyclidine). The gangs also are involved in other criminal activity including assault, auto
theft, burglary, carjacking, drive-by shooting, extortion, homicide, identification fraud, and
robbery.
Attorney General’s Report to Congress on the Growth of Violent Street Gangs in Suburban Areas, UNITED
STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Apr. 2008), http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs27/27612/appendb.htm.
149
The Crips are:
a collection of structured and unstructured gangs that have adopted a common gang culture. Crips
membership is estimated to be 30,000 to 35,000; most members are African American males from
the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Large, national-level Crips gangs include Insane Gangster
Crips, Rolling 90s Crips, and Shotgun Crips. Crips gangs operate in 221 cities in 41 states. The
main source of income for Crips gangs is the street-level distribution of powder cocaine, crack
cocaine, marijuana, and PCP. The gangs also are involved in other criminal activity such as
assault, auto theft, burglary, and homicide.
Id.
150
The Bloods and the Crips are rival gangs whose members often are linked to shootings and murders. See
generally Tom McGhee, Gangs Linked to RTD Shooting, DENVER POST, Aug. 21, 2011, at B-2 (describing
a recent shooting incident in Colorado allegedly involving the Crips, and noting that Crips were fighting
with possible Bloods gang members); Kelly Smith, Anguish in Powderhorn After Stabbing Death, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Aug. 21, 2011, at 2B (describing a recent killing in Minneapolis as “the result
of a clash between the Bloods and Crips gangs”).
151
Singer, 593 F.3d at 532.
152
Wayne D. Blackmon, Dungeons and Dragons: The Use of a Fantasy Game in the Psychotherapeutic
Treatment of a Young Adult, 48 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 624, 626 (1994).
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The game certainly has not been without controversy.153 In 1985, it was blamed for
the suicide of a thirteen-year-old Connecticut boy who regularly played D & D and, as
the New York Times reported at the time, “[s]everal school boards around the country
have banned the game on the ground that impressionable teen-agers cannot handle the
violent role playing and occult imagery. Opponents of the game have cited several
suicide notes as evidence that the game is responsible for some teen-age suicides.”154
More recently, an eighteen-year-old man charged with raping and killing a
developmentally disabled sixteen-year-old girl claimed “he was at a neighbor’s house
playing the Dungeons and Dragons Online video game in an effort to ‘forget’”155 his
gruesome actions earlier that day.
Aside from such incidents, however, the game is generally associated with socalled geeks, not gangs.156 Comedian Stephen Colbert has stated, “I’m a huge, huge geek.
I played Dungeons and Dragons the first week it came out.”157 What is more, Kevin
Singer was not your average jailhouse lawyer; he assembled fifteen affidavits regarding
D & D, including three from “role-playing game experts. He contend[ed] that the
affidavits demonstrate that there is no connection between D&D and gang activity.
Several of Singer’s affiants indeed asserted the opposite: that D&D helps rehabilitate
inmates and prevents them from joining gangs and engaging in other undesirable
activities.”158
So why did the appellate court sustain summary judgment against Kevin Singer?
First, it applied Turner’s reasonably-related-to-legitimate-penological-concerns test and
specified that of the four Turner factors used to determine reasonableness, “the first one
can act as a threshold factor regardless which way it cuts.”159 Second, in applying this
standard, the appellate court readily accepted what even it admitted was the “sole
evidence”160 offered by prison officials to support the ban on D & D materials and the
playing of the game—namely, the affidavit of Bruce Muraski, the facility’s gang
expert.161 Muraski asserted that the prohibition was necessary, in part, to protect prison
security because “cooperative games can mimic the organization of gangs and lead to the
actual development thereof.”162 In addition to prison security, Muraski claimed the ban
153

For instance, in 1990, Joseph Pottgen, Jr. of Lake City, Florida, was sentenced to twenty-two months in
prison for allegedly digging up the grave of a suicide victim as part of playing D & D. Man Gets 22 Months
for Robbing Grave, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 8, 1990, at 2B.
154
James Brooke, A Suicide Spurs Town to Debate Nature of a Game, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 1985),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/22/nyregion/a-suicide-spurs-town-to-debate-nature-of-agame.html.
155
Carly Flandro, Neighbor Charged in Rape, Killing of Puyallup Teen, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 25, 2010, at
B1.
156
See Frank Ahrens, ‘Rings’ Has Two Targets—Plan Is to Grab the Geeks So the Masses Will Follow,
WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at E1 (describing D & D as part of “classic geek markets” along with “Star
Trek,” “Star Wars,” and “Buffy the Vampire Slayer”); Seth Borenstein, Obama Hailed for His Geeky
Qualities, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (N.C.), Dec. 25, 2008, at 7A (reporting that “[g]eeks know and use
references from ‘Star Trek,’ ‘Dungeons and Dragons’ and comic books”).
157
Marc Peyser, The Truthiness Teller, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 2006, at 50.
158
Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 533. (7th Cir. 2010).
159
Id. at 534.
160
Id. at 535.
161
Supra note 147 and accompanying text (describing Muraski).
162
Singer, 593 F.3d at 535.
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would help with inmate rehabilitation because, as he stated in his affidavit, D & D can
“foster an inmate’s obsession with escaping from the real life, correctional environment,
fostering hostility, violence and escape behavior.”163 In brief, the two interests cited were
prison security and inmate rehabilitation.
Singer, in contrast, challenged the existence of a rational relationship between those
twin interests and the ban on D & D.164 The appellate court noted that Singer’s “eleven
inmate affiants—who collectively served over 100 years in prison—all testified that they
had never heard of any gang-related or other violent activity associated with D & D
gameplay or paraphernalia.”165 Another affidavit, this one from Paul Cardwell, chair and
archivist of the Committee for the Advancement of Role-Playing Games, contended that
“there are numerous scholarly works establishing that role-playing games can have
positive rehabilitative effects on prisoners.”166
The appellate court, however, was not moved by any of Singer’s affidavits and
dismissed them as “lack[ing] the qualifications necessary to determine whether the
relationship between the D & D ban and the maintenance of prison security is ‘so remote
as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.’”167 In other words, the appellate court
deferentially treated the lone affidavit submitted by Muraski to justify the prison’s D & D
policy while off-handedly dismissing Kevin Singer’s evidence. “[M]any of Singer’s
affiants are present or former inmates, but their experiential ‘expertise’ in prison security
is from the wrong side of the bars and fails to match Muraski’s perspective,”168 the
appellate court wrote, adding that “[t]he expertise critical here is that relating to prisons,
their security, and the prevention of prison gang activity. Singer’s affiants conspicuously
lack such expertise.”169
This judicial analysis puts prisoners who challenge regulations affecting their freespeech rights in a perplexing predicament when it comes to gathering evidence and, in
particular, expert testimony. How is an inmate, who lodges a pro se170 complaint—a
lawsuit filed without the benefit of a trained attorney—supposed to round-up expert
testimony? Pro se litigants, as Professor Kevin Smith observes, are “armed in most cases
with more determination than legal expertise.”171 In a recent article, Professor Ira
Robbins explains that:
Compared with other litigants, pro se prisoners are at an inherent
disadvantage. They lack many of the resources enjoyed by non-prisoner
litigants. They have limited finances and restricted access to libraries,

163

Id.
Id.
165
Id. at 536.
166
Id. at 537.
167
Id. at 536 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987)).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
The term means “on one’s own behalf.” Henry Calloway, Access to Justice Pro Se: The Growth of Pro
Se in Alabama, 63 ALA. LAW. 363, 363 (2002).
171
Kevin H. Smith, Justice for All?: The Supreme Court’s Denial of Pro Se Petitions for Certiorari, 63
ALB. L. REV. 381, 383 (1999).
164

	
  

275

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2012

legal materials, computers, the Internet, and even items that the nonincarcerated take for granted—such as paper, pens, and telephones.172
And while some pro se prisoner litigation may be frivolous,173 certainly a challenge
involving the First Amendment right to possess reading materials, even if they are about
D & D, is not inconsequential. Ultimately, in Singer, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
Muraski had “proffered evidence that the policy prohibiting possession of D & D
manuals, strategy guides, character novellas, and other related materials is rationally
related to the goal of preventing susceptible inmates from embarking upon a dangerous
escapist path”174 and that Kevin Singer’s “affidavits and briefs were unresponsive to this
evidence.”175 The appellate court noted that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Overton
“mandates deference to the views of prison authorities.”176
Attorney John G. Browning, a partner in the national law firm of Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith LLP, responded incredulously to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling:
Seriously? I’ve seen “Oz” and “The Shawshank Redemption,” and I’m
pretty sure what goes on in prisons bears no resemblance to a fantasy
game played by the geeky kids from your high school. Unlike the judges
on the 7th Circuit, I don’t think that in a prison’s sea of rampant violence,
drug use, and illiteracy there’s much chance of an inmate standing up to a
tattooed white supremacist convict by claiming to be a Level 12 paladin
with a magical sword and a spell-resistant cloak.177
The New York Times covered the appellate court’s decision as well, leading its
story sarcastically with “[p]risons can restrict the rights of inmates to nerd out.”178 The
Times’s story noted that Ilya Somin, an associate professor of law at George Mason
University, queried on The Volokh Conspiracy legal blog, “[s]hould prisons ban ‘The
Count of Monte Cristo’ on the grounds that it might encourage escape attempts?”179
Somin told the New York Times in an interview, “[i]deally, you should really have more
evidence that there is a genuine harm before you restrict something.”180 The decision was
so shocking it even drew coverage across the Atlantic Ocean in the infamous English
tabloid, the Sun.181
172

Ira Robbins, Ghostwriting: Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners’ Access to the Courts, 23 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 271, 273 (2010).
173
See generally Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62
BROOKLYN L. REV. 519 (1996) (addressing the topic of pro se prisoner litigation, and observing that “the
burden of the vast number of frivolous prisoner suits has created hostility to the entire category of
lawsuits—opposition that has the potential of obscuring the few meritorious prisoner lawsuits which are
about as scarce as the proverbial needle in the haystack”).
174
Singer, 593 F.3d at 538.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 534.
177
John G. Browning, Legally Speaking: Your Tax Dollars at Work, SOUTHEAST TEX. REC. (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://www.setexasrecord.com/arguments/224636-legally-speaking-your-tax-dollars-at-work.
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John Schwartz, Court Upholds Prison Ban on Dungeons & Dragons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at A16.
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Id.
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Id.
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Murderer, Kevin Singer, SUN (England), Feb. 3, 2010, at News 12.
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Ultimately, although Singer may be a convicted killer for whom little sympathy is
due, he was denied the opportunity to read about and partake in a fantasy game that
might have allowed him to escape—albeit, only in his mind—the misery of life behind
bars.183 And to the extent that Singer was forced to give up the ninety-six page
manuscript about D & D that he had drafted,184 the notion of individual self-realization
through speech185—in this case, creative writing about a game—was thwarted.
182

3. Dangerous Newsletters Behind Bars?
In September 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit186
applied the Supreme Court’s Turner test to affirm a district court’s order187 allowing the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections to censor the distribution behind bars of an
erstwhile newsletter called The New Abolitionist, which focused on the Wisconsin state
prison system. A large part of the dispute in this consolidated case focused on the
argument of Frank Van den Bosch, the publisher of The New Abolitionist and the member
of a group called Wisconsin Prison Watch,188 that censorship of the March 2007 issue of
his newsletter “was not rationally related to security concerns, but rather motivated by a
desire to suppress any speech critical of the prison administration and the conditions of
confinement within Wisconsin prisons.”189 In contrast, prison officials contended the
“newsletter contain[ed] misleading information, encourage[d] distrust of prison staff, and
could potentially undermine the prison’s rehabilitative initiatives.”190
Three of the articles in that issue which drew the wrath of prison officials were
written by inmates, and two of those articles were highly critical of specific aspects of the
prison system, including the Wisconsin Parole Commission and Program Review
Committee.191 The third inmate-written article dealt with inmate-initiated litigation in the
Seventh Circuit, and it “suggested that prisoners erroneously rely upon courts to seek
social change, and urged readers to ‘employ any and all means necessary, including mass
protests in front of prisons, in order to ‘bring some attention to this madness they call
182

See Madison / DD Game Is Still Banned in Prison, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Jan. 25, 2010,
(describing Singer as a “convicted killer” who was “sentenced to life in prison in 2002 after he was
convicted of bludgeoning his sister's boyfriend to death with a sledgehammer”).
183
The authors are not asserting here that inmates have the right to live in a happy, fun, or pleasant
environment, but rather that speech and expression provide basic mechanisms for mitigating, even if only
momentarily, the ills of prison with liberating thoughts and flights of imagination. Cf. Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (observing that “First Amendment freedoms are most in danger
when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to
think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the
beginning of thought”).
184
See supra note 151 and accompanying text (referencing this manuscript).
185
See Eberle, supra note 95 (addressing the theory of self-realization through speech).
186
Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19031 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 2011).
187
Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, No. 09-cv-62-bbc, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111196 (W.D. Wisc. Dec. 1,
2009).
188
See George Hesselberg, Charges on Record for One, Not for Other, WISC. STATE J., Oct. 5, 2008, at D1
(identifying Van den Bosch as with Wisconsin Prison Watch).
189
Van den Bosch, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19031, at *17.
190
Id. at *23.
191
Id. at *4–5.
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prison life.’”192 Finally, a fourth article written by Van den Bosch allegedly contained
inaccurate information about the availability of inmate jobs at the Wisconsin Secure
Program Facility.193
As with the Singer case described above,194 all it took for the Seventh Circuit to
uphold the censorship was a lone affidavit from a supposed expert prison official. In this
case, it was the affidavit of Dan Westfield, security chief of Wisconsin’s Department of
Corrections Division of Adult Institutions, that set forth boilerplate reasons justifying the
censorship the Seventh Circuit upheld.195 Despite noting that that Westfield’s affidavit
was “arguably vague in certain respects”—much like the Tenth Circuit in Sperry openly
admitting the affidavit of the pivotal prison official in that case was “very
conclusory”196—the Seventh Circuit wrote that “prisons maintain broad discretion in
prohibiting material in prison that potentially endangers institutional security.”197
Through this deferential lens, it ruled that Westfield’s vague affidavit did “identify
several passages in the March 2007 newsletter that may reasonably encourage distrust of
prison staff and threaten prison security. Plaintiff’s disagreement with defendant
Westfield’s assessment is insufficient to establish that confiscation of the newsletter was
not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”198
The phrase “several passages” is emphasized above because it demonstrates how,
unlike in the context of obscenity199 where a work must be considered as a whole before
it is deemed to fall outside the scope of constitutional protection,200 courts like the
Seventh Circuit support censoring an entire issue of a newsletter merely because “several
passages”201 allegedly might lead to distrust of prison staff and threaten prison security.
This too is indicative of the type of judicial deference accorded to prison officials—
deference that deviates from the Supreme Court’s maxim in obscenity law that “the First
Amendment requires that redeeming value be judged by considering the work as a
whole.”202
Perhaps even more relevant within the context of the newsletter in Van den Bosch,
Judge Robert D. Sack notes in the latest edition of his treatise on defamation that “a court
will not isolate particular phrases and determine whether, considered alone, they are
192

Id. at *5.
Id. at *4.
194
Subpart II.A.2.
195
Van den Bosch, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19031, at *21 (observing that the defendants relied “almost
exclusively on the affidavit of defendant Westfield”).
196
Sperry v. Werholtz, 413 Fed. Appx. 31, 39 n.4. (10th Cir. 2011); see also subpart II.A.1.
197
Van den Bosch, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19031, at *25.
198
Id. (emphasis added).
199
Obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. See Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (writing that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press”).
200
In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that when
determining whether material is obscene, jurors and judges must consider: 1) whether the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to a
prurient interest; 2) whether it depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and 3) whether, taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
201
Van den Bosch, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19031, at *25.
202
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 248 (2002).
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defamatory. The rule that words are to be read in the context of the communication as a
whole applies to books and broadcasts, as well as to letters and newspaper and periodical
articles and advertisements.”203 When it comes to interpreting works read by inmates,
however, such an article-as-a-whole requirement for interpreting a message’s meaning in
newsletter is jettisoned. Meaning is instead construed from the biased perspective of
prison officials based on a few isolated passages.
First Amendment scholars will note that this logic comports with the deference
given to public school officials in interpreting meaning in student-written messages. In
particular, in its 2007 Morse v. Frederick204 opinion, the United States Supreme Court
was highly deferential to principal Deborah Morse’s interpretation of the meaning of the
obtuse declaration “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.”205 Although the Morse majority acknowledged
the phrase was “cryptic”206 and “probably means nothing at all”207 to some people, it
nonetheless accepted Deborah Morse’s conclusion that “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” would be
interpreted by viewers as promoting illegal drug use, calling such an interpretation
“plainly a reasonable one.”208
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Justice John Paul Stevens blasted the deference provided by the majority on the
meaning/interpretation issue. “[I]t is one thing to restrict speech that advocates drug use.
It is another thing entirely to prohibit an obscure message with a drug theme that a third
party subjectively—and not very reasonably—thinks is tantamount to express
advocacy,”209 Stevens opined. He dubbed the majority’s approach to meaning
“indefensible,”210 criticizing it for “deferring to the principal's ‘reasonable’ judgment that
Frederick’s sign qualified as drug advocacy.”211
Ultimately, this deferral to the judgment of government administrators who run
prisons and public schools on the question of meaning represents another dimension of
the institutional deference that cuts across the penal and educational systems.212

203

ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 2:4.2 (4th ed.
2011) (emphasis added).
204
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
205
Id. at 397 (noting that student Joseph Frederick “and his friends unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the
phrase: ‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS’” as the Olympic Torch Relay passed by Frederick’s school, JuneauDouglas High School, on January 24, 2002).
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Id. at 401.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Id. at 441.
211
Id.
212
See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text (noting the similarities between how prisoners and public
school students are treated under the law with regard to speech rights); see also Scott Moss, Students and
Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First
Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1639 (2007) (observing that “[c]ourts allow plaintiffs’
speech within certain institutions—public schools, workplaces, and prisons—to be heavily restricted
because it occurs within that institution,” and adding that “in these three contexts, it is courts’ extreme
institutional tailoring that yields underprotection”).
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4. Protecting the Right to Receive a Magazine About the Prison System
While the Seventh Circuit spent September 2011 upholding the censorship of a
newsletter critical of the Wisconsin penal system in Van den Bosch, the Ninth Circuit that
same month denied a petition for rehearing en banc in Hrdlicka v. Reniff213 involving
another prison-centric publication, namely Crime, Justice & America (CJA) magazine.
Hrdlicka, in fact, marks a relatively rare free-speech triumph under the Turner standard,
as the Ninth Circuit reversed two grants of summary judgment214 in favor of the
government officials in charge of the jails in both Butte County, California, and
Sacramento County, California, who refused to distribute unsolicited copies of CJA to
inmates.215
Just what type of magazine is CJA and who is its publisher, Ray Hrdlicka? The
magazine boasts on its website that it promises to:
inform, explain, entertain, interpret, uncover, and question the relevant
issues in the criminal justice system: local, regional, and nationwide.
Specialized demographic sections will reach all people involved in the
criminal justice system: new arrestees, attorneys, law enforcement,
judiciary, court personnel, sentenced prisoners, survivors and victims,
friends and family on both sides of the law.216
Publisher Ray Hrdlicka, a Chicago native, holds a private investigator’s license and
has worked as a repo man,217 a bounty hunter, and in the bail-bond business, the last of
which reaped $30 million annually by 2001 for Hrdlicka but later went bankrupt.218
According to a 2005 profile in California’s East Bay Express, Hrdlicka started CJA in
May 2002 and, by 2005, it was “distributed in 31 California counties, with special
editions for large counties like Los Angeles and for regional groups of smaller ones.”219
In a precursor to the legal disputes that later would come before the Ninth Circuit in
Hrdlicka v. Reniff, however, jail authorities in Sonoma County, California in February
213

Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18218 (9th Cir.
Sept. 1, 2011).
214
See Crime, Justice & America, Inc. v. Reniff, 2:08-cv-343-GEB-EFB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21976
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009) (involving the refusal to distribute CJA to inmates at the Butte County Jail, and
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Perry Reniff, the Butte County sheriff); Crime, Justice &
America, Inc. v. McGuiness, No. Civ. 08-cv-00394 FCD EFB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67054 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 3, 2009) (involving the refusal to distribute CJA to inmates at the Sacramento County Jail and
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant John McGinness, the Sacramento County sheriff and the
individual in charge of managing the Sacramento County Jail).
215
Hrdlicka, 631 F.3d at 1046.
216
Mission Statement, CRIME, JUSTICE & AMERICA, http://crimejusticeandamerica.com/mission-statements
(last visited May 8, 2012).
217
See Roman Gokhman, Now Hiring: Ringmaster of Crime, Justice Media, INSIDE BAY AREA (Cal.), Sept.
6, 2006 (reporting that Hrdlicka “worked as a bounty hunter and for 14 years he ran the largest bail bond
business in the country,” and that “he began the climb up the ladder of non-government justice at 22 as a
repo man working for a private investigator”).
218
Stefanie Kalem, Publisher for Perpetrators, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Cal.) (Sept. 28, 2005),
http://www.eastbayexpress.com/ebx/publisher-for-the-perpetrators/Content?oid=1079167.
219
Id.
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2004 “refused to distribute the magazine after concluding its articles were too
provocative.”220
Ray Hrdlicka’s 2011 battle before the Ninth Circuit involved his inability to
distribute unsolicited copies of CJA at the jails in both Butte County and Sacramento
County.221 In ruling in favor of Hrdlicka in January 2011, a two-judge majority of the
Ninth Circuit initially rejected a rather sweeping, categorical assertion by the
defendants—that “the First Amendment does not protect distribution of a publication to
inmates who have not requested it.”222 In doing so, the majority initially held that
publishers—not simply inmates—have a First Amendment interest at stake and that this
interest “does not depend on a recipient’s prior request for that information.”223 The
majority derived this latter conclusion from cases in non-prison settings that involved
restrictions on unsolicited leafleting and handbilling, and it found “no reason why this
well-established principle does not apply to a publisher’s interest in distributing, and an
inmate’s corresponding interest in receiving, unsolicited literature.”224
In stark contrast, however, Judge N. Randy Smith filed a lone dissent that accepted
the defendants’ blanket assertion that there is no First Amendment right to distribute
unsolicited publications of any kind behind bars.225 “[T]he simpler and saner rule,” Judge
Smith opined, “is that Hrdlicka has no special First Amendment right to demand that a
prison agree to one of his distribution methods. A prison is not a public forum, and a ban
on unrequested publications is a content neutral method for sheriffs to ensure efficient
administration of their facilities.”226 Smith, a former Idaho state judge and a former Idaho
chairman of the Republican Party who was appointed to the Ninth Circuit by President
George W. Bush,227 derisively characterized Hdrlicka as “asking the court to create a
special rule, under the First Amendment”228 and concluded that “Hrdlicka does not have
a special First Amendment right to demand distribution in prisons.”229 The majority
rebutted the notion that Ray Hrdlicka was asking for something “special” with regard to
unsolicited distribution of his magazine by asserting that Hrdlicka’s First Amendment

220
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Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
18218 (9th. Cir. Sept. 1, 2011).
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Id. at 1048.
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Id. at 1055–58 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 1057–58.
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See Peter Blumberg, Why Aren’t They Asked?, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 25, 2006, at Forum E1 (writing
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touchy issues, nominees Sandra Ikuta and Milan Smith, both Los Angeles lawyers, and Idaho state Judge
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argument should be treated under the traditional Turner test and that the unsolicited
nature of distribution was simply a factor to be considered under Turner.230
After rejecting the defendants’ blanket assertion that there is no First Amendment
right to distribute unsolicited publications of any kind behind bars, the two-judge
majority turned its attention to the more narrow issue of the constitutionality under
Turner of the ban on unsolicited copies of CJA in the Butte County and Sacramento
County jails. The majority called the first of the Turner quartet of reasonable factors the
sine qua non—the essential or critical factor which, if not satisfied, ends the inquiry
without the court needing to consider the other three Turner factors.231
B. Federal District Court Opinions
1. No “R” Rated Movies for Inmates
In Avila v. Cate,232 a federal district court considered an inmate’s First Amendment
challenge to a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) policy233
prohibiting the showing behind bars of any and all movies rated “higher” than PG-13,
namely those carrying R234 and NC-17235 designations.236 The policy was implemented
230

See id. at 1051 (opining that “[t]he fact that in this case the publication was unsolicited may, of course,
be taken into account in applying the Turner test. But the fact that the publication was unsolicited does not
make the Turner test inapplicable”).
231
Id. at 1051.
232
Avila v. Cate, No. 1:10-cv-01208 JLT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73809 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2011).
233
The policy provides, in relevant part:
Only those movies/videos which have been given a rating of “G,” “PG,” or “PG-13” by the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) or that have been placed on the department’s
discretionary showing list may be considered for viewing. Movies/videos which have been given a
rating of other than “G,” “PG,” or “PG-13” by the Motion Picture Association of America shall
not be approved for general inmate viewing. Regardless of their rating or listing, movies/videos
which, in the opinion of the reviewer, glorify violence or sex, or are inflammatory to the climate
of the facility shall not be shown.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3220.4(b) (2011).
234
The Motion Picture Association of America defines an “R” rated movie as one that:
contains some adult material. An R-rated motion picture may include adult themes, adult activity,
hard language, intense or persistent violence, sexually-oriented nudity, drug abuse or other
elements, so that parents are counseled to take this rating very seriously. Children under 17 are not
allowed to attend R-rated motion pictures unaccompanied by a parent or adult guardian. Parents
are strongly urged to find out more about R-rated motion pictures in determining their suitability
for their children. Generally, it is not appropriate for parents to bring their young children with
them to R-rated motion pictures.
What Each Rating Means, MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,
http://www.mpaa.org/ratings/what-each-rating-means (last visited May 8, 2012).
235
The Motion Picture Association of America defines an “NC-17” rated movie as one that:
most parents would consider patently too adult for their children 17 and under. No children will be
admitted. NC-17 does not mean “obscene” or “pornographic” in the common or legal meaning of
those words, and should not be construed as a negative judgment in any sense. The rating simply
signals that the content is appropriate only for an adult audience. An NC-17 rating can be based on
violence, sex, aberrational behavior, drug abuse or any other element that most parents would
consider too strong and therefore off-limits for viewing by their children.
Id.
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for security reasons and intended to prevent the presentation of movies that “glorify sex
or violence or inflame the prison population.”237 To further this interest, the policy
adopted the Motion Picture Association of American (MPAA) rating system, which is a
voluntary—rather than government imposed—rating system used by the motion picture
industry in the United States.238
Inmate Perry Robert Avila, however, argued that the MPAA rating system was
devised to provide “parents with warnings about what movies they should and should not
permit their children to see,”239 not for guiding prison officials’ decisions about content
that incarcerated adults may watch. Indeed, the MPAA’s website states that its rating
system “endures and evolves as a useful and valued tool for parents and an essential
guardian of Americans’ freedom of artistic, creative and political expression.”240 Richard
Mosk, former chairman of the MPAA’s Classification and Rating Administration, made
this point clear in a 1997 article, writing that “[t]he voluntary system of rating motion
pictures for the benefit of American parents has become a widely used component of the
American movie scene.”241
Furthermore, it is well established that governmental entities may not adopt
voluntary rating systems created by private agencies in order to censor media content.242
Such implementation constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of government authority
to a private entity.243 Attorney Colin Miller emphasized this point in a law journal article,
asserting that if courts “allow governmental agencies to rely upon MPAA ratings when
censoring films, courts will be giving too much power to the MPAA, a private
organization, to inform government censorship decisions based on nebulous standards.
This use was not historically intended by the MPAA and is not justified.”244 Inmate Avila
236

Avila, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73809, at *14 (writing that “[p]laintiff challenges the complete ban on
movies rated ‘higher’ than PG-13”).
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Id. at *12.
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Id. at *3–4.
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Id. at *4.
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Ratings History: Safeguarding Artistic Freedom, MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,
http://www.mpaa.org/ratings/ratings-history (last visited May 8, 2012) (emphasis added).
241
Richard M. Mosk, Motion Picture Ratings in the United States, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 135, 135
(1997) (emphasis added).
242
See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071 (D. Minn. 2006), aff’d, 519 F.3d 768
(8th Cir. 2008) (involving the adoption by the state of Minnesota of the voluntary rating system for video
games developed by the Entertainment Software Rating Board, and holding that “such a delegation of
authority, whether the penalty for violation of the Act be civil or criminal, violates the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, and renders the Act unconstitutional”); Engdahl v. City of Kenosha, 317 F. Supp. 1133,
1135–36 (E.D. Wisc. 1970) (holding that it was improper for a state to delegate to the MPAA and its rating
system the authority to determine whether movies are proper for minors).
243
As one federal court wrote in considering the adoption by Minnesota of the voluntary rating system for
video games developed by the Entertainment Software Rating Board:
The Court finds the Act’s delegation of authority to the ESRB to determine those video games
which a child under 17 years of age may rent or purchase is improper. The ESRB rating is
determined by a private body with no duty to answer to the public. Indeed, the rating scheme does
not provide a method for the public or the State to challenge a rating once it is determined; only
video game publishers are given that right.
Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
244
Colin Miller, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Wolf v. Ashcroft and the Constitutionality of Using the
MPAA Ratings to Censor Films in Prison, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 265, 283 (2004).
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thus argued both that the CDCR “ceded governmental authority over prisoners’ First
Amendment rights to the MPAA”245 and that the policy banning any and all movies rated
higher than PG-13 was overbroad.246
Despite these facts and opinions, in July 2011, however, United States Magistrate
Judge Jennifer Thurston applied Turner247 and concluded that the CDCR’s “reliance on
the MPAA system is reasonable even though it may exclude movies that do not further
penological goals”248 and that the regulation was “reasonable and, while overbroad in
some respects, not unconstitutional. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable
First Amendment claim against any of the defendants.”249
Both of the statements quoted immediately above illustrate the vast deference
accorded to prison officials: 1) it was perfectly acceptable that the policy excludes some
movies that do not further any penological goals; and 2) it was fine that the policy was
“overbroad in some respects.”250 Magistrate Thurston acknowledged “that the R- and the
NC-17 ratings, may be assigned to movies that contain no violence or sexuality,”251 but
she concluded that “the breadth of the regulation does not render it constitutionally
infirm.”252 Apparently there also is a key difference between the print medium and
motion pictures for inmates behind bars. In considering the second Turner factor,
Magistrate Thurston mixed media, as it were. She asserted that printed material featuring
the same content that the MPAA might consider to be R or NC-17 rated would be
allowed behind bars and constitute an appropriate alternative means for a prisoner to
exercise his First Amendment right to receive speech.253 In brief, written descriptions
constitute a suitable substitute for visual images and motion pictures.
Ultimately, Magistrate Thurston’s conclusion in Avila is consistent with that of a
federal district court in Pennsylvania, which held in 2006 under Turner that inmates “do
not have a First Amendment right to R-rated movies per se. Instead, Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment right, most narrowly defined, is the right to receive information and ideas
through a broad range of movies.”254 The decision in Avila also comports with a
Massachusetts federal district court opinion from 2008 that employed a Turner analysis
to uphold a ban on movies rated R, X, and NC-17 by the MPAA.255
The bottom line is that when it comes to the right to view movies behind bars, at
least three courts now allow prison officials to implement the MPAA rating system,
despite its vague nature and the fact that it broadly sweeps up movies, particularly those
in the R category, that may not serve any legitimate penological interests in safety,
security, or rehabilitation. Furthermore, a policy that was designed to help parents to
245

Avila, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73809, at *15.
See id. at *14 (writing that “the focus of Plaintiff[’s] challenge is his claim that the regulation is
overbroad”).
247
See id. at **9–30 (applying the quartet of Turner factors).
248
Id. at *24.
249
Id. at *30.
250
Id.
251
Id. at *16.
252
Id. at *17.
253
Id. at **25–26.
254
Jewell v. Gonzales, 420 F. Supp. 2d 406, 438 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
255
Gaskins v. Clarke, No. 07-10084-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3150, at **6–7 (D. Mass. Jan. 16, 2008).
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protect their children256 has been turned into a tool of censorship to be used and abused
by prison officials. It seemingly makes little difference to courts that the delegation of
government responsibility to create a rating system to a private entity—the MPAA—
conflicts with the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation.257
Finally, it is worth noting the parallel here again between the rights of public school
students and prisoners. In particular, a federal district court in 1995 upheld a public
school district’s reliance on the MPAA rating system “as a filter of films.”258 In Borger,
as in Avila, movies rated R were considered forbidden fruit,259 with United States District
Judge John W. Reynolds reasoning that “[a]n R-rating indicates that reasonable people
could determine that high school students should not view the film”260 and concluding
that “‘reasonableness’ is all that is necessary in a high school setting. This is a
constitutional exercise of school board discretion.”261
2. Dangerous Pressure Points of Censorship?
The 2010 federal district court ruling in Starr v. Moore262 pivoted on inmate Darren
Starr’s desire to read two books about acupuncture and qi,263 Fundamentals of Chinese
Acupuncture264 and The Color Atlas of Acupuncture, while incarcerated at the Northern
New Hampshire Correctional Facility.265 The tomes were mailed to Starr in prison
directly from their respective publishers, in compliance with the prison’s media policy.266
256

See supra notes 240–241 (describing the original purpose of the MPAA rating system).
See supra notes 242–244 (addressing the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of authority).
258
Borger v. Bisciglia, 888 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D. Wisc. 1995).
259
See id. at 101 (noting that “‘R’ ratings are the threshold which the School Board has chosen as movies
that will not even be considered”).
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Starr v. Moore, No. 09-cv-440-JL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85426, at **4–5 (D. N.H. July 27, 2010),
approved, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85025 (D. N.H. Aug. 18, 2010).
263
Qi, according to the court, “is a life force or vital energy believed by some to circulate through the
body,” while acupuncture “is based on the principle that the unimpeded and balanced circulation of qi
through pathways in the body is essential to good health.” Id. at **3–4.
264
ANDREW ELLIS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CHINESE ACUPUNCTURE (Paradigm Publications Rev. Ed.
1991). The publisher of the book describes it as:
one of the most-used acupuncture books in the profession. Perhaps first and foremost it is because
the authors have applied a precise method of translation that allows clinical experience to be
directly transmitted. As well, they have drawn on both modern and classical clinical sources. Thus
the text provides consistent information that can be cross-referenced not only to the several
companion works but to any translation that maintains a reliable relation to the Chinese language.
The information presented includes all the channels, including the extraordinary channels, the
main, internal, branch, divergent, connecting, sinew, and alternate pathways as they are currently
understood in the People’s Republic of China.
Fundamentals of Chinese Acupuncture, PARADIGM PUBLICATIONS, http://www.paradigmpubs.com/catalog/detail/FunChiAcu (last visited May 8, 2012).
265
HANS ULRICH-HECKER ET AL., THE COLOR ATLAS OF ACUPUNCTURE: BODY POINTS—EAR POINTS—
TRIGGER POINTS (2d ed. 2008). According to a description of The Color Atlas of Acupuncture on the
publisher’s website, the book is “a flexi textbook that contains information on all the major body and ear
acupuncture points, as well as an extensive coverage of trigger points. The text is augmented by 126
illustrations pertaining to body acupuncture, 48 illustrations on ear acupuncture, and 114 illustrations on
trigger points.” The Color Atlas of Acupuncture, THIEME MEDICAL PUBLISHERS,
257
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When the books arrived, a mailroom officer initially approved their delivery to
Starr, but a corrections officer later questioned their suitability and returned them to the
mailroom officer, asking that they be examined by the New Hampshire Department of
Corrections’s (NHDOC) Library Review Committee (LRC).268 The LRC, which is
comprised of NHDOC staff members in the areas of security, education, and mental
health, denied delivery because the books allegedly would “encourage physical
violence.”269
Starr appealed to prison officials, asserting the pair of books actually promote
health and healing and “in no way instruct readers in or encourage the use of violence.”270
In a preemptive strike against potential LRC arguments about their anatomical content,
Starr contended that “the prison already allows inmates to receive books about human
anatomy.”271
The corrections officer responding to Starr’s grievance at the first level of review
stated that he was not so much worried about the anatomical depictions as he was with
the “fact that the book specifically discusses and depicts vital pressure points and nerve
bundles in the human body, and that if such information was misused by an inmate, the
result could be permanent injury or death to another person.”272 Prison officials further
asserted “this information could be misused and cause a breach of safety and security
within the prison.”273 Put more bluntly, the assumption of officials was that a little bit of
knowledge about bodily pressure points is a dangerous thing because prisoners will use
and abuse it to kill others. Two other officers affirmed these safety justifications in their
respective responses to Starr’s second and third grievance filings,274 ultimately sparking
the lawsuit.
United States Magistrate Judge Landya B. McCafferty applied the four Turner
factors.275 In another stunning display of deference to prison officials, Magistrate
McCafferty determined that “the prison’s concerns are reasonable and legitimate, and as
such, may provide the basis for the regulation and restriction of incoming reading
materials at the prison.”276 She reasoned “the prison took a measured and reasonable
approach to the possibility of introducing materials into the prison and found through that
process that the information in the books has the potential for enabling serious or deadly
consequences if misused.”277
Magistrate McCafferty acknowledged the deference she provided prison officials,
writing that a “[c]ourt must accord prison administrators significant deference in defining
267

http://www.thieme.com/index.php?page=shop.product_details&flypage=flypage.tpl&product_id=675&cate
gory_id=8&option=com_virtuemart&Itemid=53 (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
266
Starr, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85426, at *4.
267
Id. at *4.
268
Id.
269
Id. at *5.
270
Id.
271
Id. at *6.
272
Id. at *10.
273
Id.
274
Id. at *5.
275
Id. at *3.
276
Id. at *11.
277
Id. at *12.

	
  286

Vol. 7:2]

Clay Calvert & Kara Carnley Murrhee

legitimate goals for the corrections system, and for determining the best means of
accomplishing those goals.”278 Notably, the Starr opinion is devoid of any factual
evidence or testimony that either of the two books ever has been used—whether by
people behind bars or otherwise—to cause the types of harms prison officials conjured
up. Mere speculation and supposition was all that was needed to suppress two books that
neither endorse nor condone violence. Likewise, there was no evidence that either book
provided either a roadmap or set of instructions for how to commit violent acts. The Starr
opinion thus represents the application of a toothless Turner test.
3. White Supremacist Magazines & Sexually Graphic Comics
In April 2011, in Miskam v. McAllister,279 United States District Judge J. Michael
Seabright rejected an inmate’s First Amendment-based challenge to prison officials’
refusal to allow him to possess copies of the white-supremacist magazine Resistance280
and the sexually graphic comic book Satan’s Sodomy Baby.281 While housed at
California’s High Desert State Prison (HDSP), Travis George Miskam was denied access
to the former publication under a state regulation that prohibits inmates from possessing
“[a]ny matter of a character tending to incite murder; arson; riot; or any form of violence
or physical harm to any person, or any ethnic, gender, racial, religious, or other group.”282
Access to the latter publication was blocked at HDSP under California regulations
prohibiting the possession of both “[o]bscene” content283 and “[s]exually explicit images
that depict frontal nudity in the form of personal photographs, drawings, magazines, or
other pictorial format.”284
Inmate Miskam raised an “as-applied challenge that the denial of these publications
pursuant to these provisions was not reasonably related to penological interests.”285 Not
surprisingly, given its adoption in all of the other recent cases examined in this Article,
Judge Seabright applied Turner and its quartet of factors to analyze this issue, calling the
test a “deferential”286 one under which inmates face a “heavy burden.”287
Indeed, the burden proved too heavy for Miskam to meet, with Judge Seabright
finding a logical relationship between censoring the white supremacist magazine
278

Id. at **12–13.
Miskam v. McAllister, No. 2:08-02229 JMS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43146 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2011).
280
Judge Seabright described Resistance as “a magazine directed to white supremacists” that “supports
violence against non-white races.” Id. at *5. For instance, the judge quoted one article in an issue of the
magazine to which inmate Miskam was denied access at HDSP as calling on readers to “[s]top the bullshit,
get off your asses, and Unite & Fight! If only one kid wakes up and starts fighting for his race, then I feel
it’s worth it.” Id. The magazine invoked invectives against both blacks and Jews. Id. at *4–5.
281
One prison official filed a declaration stating that this comic book “vividly depicts, displays and
describes penetration of the anus and contact between the genitals and mouth[, and] that throughout the
comic were descriptions of sexual acts and exhibitions of frontal nudity of the male and female breasts and
genitals.” Id. at *5–6.
282
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3006(c)(1) (2011).
283
§ 3006(c)(15).
284
§ 3006(c)(15).
285
Miskam, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43146, at *14.
286
Id. at *15.
287
Id.
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Resistance and the penological interests in safety and security.288 The judge cited as
support for this conclusion the declaration of a prison official that “[i]n the five years
prior to the denial of Resistance, there were fifteen recorded incidents of lockdown at
HDSP as a result of racial tension.”289 The logic adopted by Judge Seabright for how
possession of Resistance would cause future violence behind bars went as follows:
Given the history of racially motivated violence at HDSP and Resistance’s
racially inflammatory theme, other prisoners could certainly observe the
racially based materials in Plaintiff’s possession, draw conclusions about
his beliefs and affiliations, and further the racial tension and violence.
Violence, of course, would also jeopardize safety of correctional officers
charged with maintaining the peace at HDSP.290
The fact that there was absolutely no evidence demonstrating that possession of
Resistance had caused any violence behind bars simply was not relevant, according to
Judge Seabright.291 The judge wrote, “a prison need not show that a banned publication
actually caused conflict; the focus is instead on whether the ban is reasonably related to a
penological interest.”292
First Amendment scholars familiar with the realm of student speech issues will
quickly recognize the parallel between Judge Seabright’s use of past racial violence in the
prison context to justify squelching possession of a white supremacist magazine and
school officials’ use of past racial tension and violence in on-campus educational settings
to justify squelching the display of the confederate flag.293 As one federal appellate court
recently wrote, “a school may reasonably forecast that the Confederate flag would cause
substantial and material disruption of a school when the school had recently experienced

288

Id. at **16–17.
Id. at *17.
290
Id. at *19.
291
Id. at *20.
292
Id. at *20.
293
See A.M. v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that “[o]ther circuits, applying Tinker, have
held that administrators may prohibit the display of the Confederate flag in light of racial hostility and
tension at their schools”); B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 734, 739 (8th Cir. 2009) (writing
that “Tinker and its progeny allow a school to ‘forecast’ a disruption and take necessary precautions before
racial tensions escalate out of hand. As a result of race-related incidents both in and out of the school, the
administration reasonably denied the display of the Confederate flag within the school,” and adding that
“[o]ur holding is in line with our sister circuits that have addressed this issue”).
The reference in both of the above cases to Tinker refers to the United States Supreme Court’s
seminal student-speech decision. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(providing First Amendment-based speech protection to public school students who wore black armbands
affixed with peace signs to their school in order to make a political statement about the war in Vietnam).
See generally Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed But Still Standing, 58 AM.
U. L. REV. 1167 (2009) (providing a relatively recent overview of Tinker and its lasting legacy in studentspeech cases).
289
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intense racial conflict.”294 This is yet another parallel between the speech rights of public
school students and inmates noted earlier in this Article.295
As for Satan’s Sodomy Baby, Judge Seabright relied on a long line of precedent
from other courts that analyzed and upheld under Turner prison rules prohibiting the
possession of sexually explicit materials.296 Those cases allow censorship of such
materials on the grounds that their suppression is reasonably related to goals of prison
security and inmate rehabilitation.297
4. Rebuffing the Censorship of Sexually Themed Literature
As an isolated island of victory encircled by a choppy sea of judicial defeats for
prisoners’ First Amendment rights, Couch v. Jabe298 merits special attention. In
particular, it provides an important lesson to prison officials about the need to both
carefully craft speech-based regulations and to enforce them consistently. Furthermore,
Couch stands out as a case in which a plaintiff-inmate prevailed without attorney
assistance299 and in which a judge, although acknowledging the very deferential approach
generally taken under Turner,300 shredded the specious logic of prison officials and
refused to accede to their tortured reasoning.301
In Couch, a federal district court in 2010 declared unconstitutional a Virginia
Department of Corrections (VDOC) policy restricting inmate access to “explicit or
graphic depictions or descriptions of sexual acts.”302 The policy, prison officials asserted,
was necessary in order “to provide for the efficient, safe, and secure administration of
VDOC facilities by limiting materials which might be disruptive in myriad ways” and to
help with the rehabilitation process of inmates “by limiting materials which might be
counter-productive.”303 In particular, prison officials claimed that sexual materials: 1) are
294

Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 568 (6th Cir. 2008).
Supra notes 62–64, 204–208, 212, 258–261 and accompanying text (referencing the parallels between
the speech rights of students and inmates).
296
Miskam, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43146, at *22–27.
297
Id. at *23.
298
737 F. Supp. 2d 561 (W.D. Va. 2010).
299
See id. at 562 (noting that inmate William Couch was “proceeding pro se”); see also Peter Vieth, Senior
U.S. District Judge James C. Turk Rules Virginia Prison Censorship Irrational, VA. LAW. WKLY., Sept.
13, 2010 (noting that the “opinion marks a win for an inmate who argued, without the assistance of a
lawyer”).
300
Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 566 (observing that “[m]any regulations have been approved because the
application of the Turner factors has always been a very deferential standard”).
301
See infra notes 307–333 and accompanying text (setting forth Judge James Turk’s analysis in the case).
302
Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (concluding that the policy was “facially unconstitutional”). The
provision in question, VDOC Operating Policy 803.2, prohibited the receipt and possession of materials
containing “[e]xplicit or graphic depictions or descriptions of sexual acts,” and it defined such materials as
including:
a. Actual sexual intercourse, normal or perverted, anal, or oral;
b. Secretion or excretion of bodily fluids or substances in the context of sexual activity;
c. Lewd exhibitions of uncovered genitals in the context of sexual activity;
d. Bondage, sadistic, masochistic or other violent acts in the context of sexual activity; [and]
e. Any sexual acts in violation of state or federal law.
Id. at 563.
303
Id. at 564.
295
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so valuable behind bars that their possession “may lead to stealing, fights, assaults and
other disruptive activities;” 2) could lead to violence among inmates who are aroused by
reading them and seek immediate sexual gratification; and 3) could contribute to the
sexual harassment of prison staff and create a hostile working environment.304
William Couch, however, simply wanted to read a couple of books while serving
multiple life sentences at the Augusta Correctional Center in Craigsville, Virginia, for
committing a series of rapes and thefts in the early 1990s.305 He filed a civil rights
claim306 against VDOC officials after two books with what United States District Judge
James Turk called a “storied, litigious history”—James Joyce’s Ulysses and D. H.
Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover307—were removed from the prison library in
2009.308 Those tomes have long been targets of censorship in the United States due to
their sexual content,309 and Judge Turk speculated that Couch might have selected them
precisely for that reason.310
Analyzing Couch’s claim, Judge Turk initially observed that although inmates have
no First Amendment right to “a general purpose reading library,”311 prison officials who
voluntarily establish such facilities must then play by the same First Amendment rules
that apply to the removal of books from the shelves of public school libraries.312 Once
again illustrating the parallel between the rights of prisoners and public school students,
Judge Turk wrote, “these two classes of individuals are similarly situated for the purposes
of this analysis.”313 For Judge Turk, the case boiled down to how prison officials
exercised their discretion when deciding what material to exclude and remove from the

304

Id. at 570.
See Couch v. Jabe, No. 5:10-cv-00072, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43356, at *6 (W.D. Va. Apr. 21, 2011)
(involving a lawsuit by Couch that unsuccessfully challenged a prison policy prohibiting him from growing
a beard, and “Couch is serving multiple life sentences, plus 37 years, for multiple counts of rape, robbery,
and statutory burglary”); Mike Gangloff, Judge Backs Inmate on Prison Reading Material Policy,
ROANOKE TIMES (Va.), Sept. 2, 2010, at A7 (noting that Couch “is serving multiple life sentences for a
string of rapes and thefts in the early 1990s”).
306
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010).
307
Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 563 n.2. See generally EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK
EVERYWHERE: THE LAW OF OBSCENITY AND THE ASSAULT ON GENIUS 7–39, 83–97, 338–341 (1992)
(chronicling the controversies surrounding the publishing and censorship of Ulysses and of Lady
Chatterley’s Lover).
308
Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
309
See, e.g., Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of State of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959)
(involving the censorship of a motion picture version of Lady Chatterley’s Lover); United States v. One
Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934) (involving the government seizure
of Ulysses due to its sexual content, but concluding “that Ulysses is a book of originality and sincerity of
treatment and that it has not the effect of promoting lust”); Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp.
488, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (involving censorship of an unexpurgated version of Lady Chatterley’s Lover by
the Postmaster of New York, and concluding the book was “not obscene within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461, and is entitled to the protections guaranteed to freedoms of speech and press by the First
Amendment”).
310
See Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 563 n.2 (“These two books were, perhaps, chosen by the plaintiff to serve
as the basis for his complaint because of their storied, litigious history.”).
311
Id. at 564.
312
Id. at 565.
313
Id.
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library,314 with inmate Couch arguing the policy was unconstitutionally overbroad in
providing those officials with too much discretion.315
In addressing this issue, Judge Turk avoided traditional overbreadth criteria316 due
to the case’s prison setting and, instead, applied Turner’s reasonably-related-tolegitimate-penological-interests test.317 Although noting that courts often uphold
regulations banning sexually explicit material under Turner,318 Judge Turk reached the
opposite conclusion in Couch and remarked that some regulations simply fall “beyond
the limits of even a deferential application of the Turner standard.”319
In fact, Judge Turner did not need to venture very far into a Turner analysis before
enjoining enforcement of the policy, writing that “consideration of just the first and
fourth Turner factors are more than sufficient to indicate the unconstitutional nature”320
of the VDOC’s policy on sexually explicit material. As to the first factor—whether a
rational connection exists between the regulation and a legitimate governmental
interest—Judge Turk bristled at the fact that VDOC’s policy results in the censorship of
many great works of literature321 while simultaneously and incongruously permitting
access to what he dubbed “soft core”322 magazines like Playboy.
“[I]t is unlikely that a cogent argument could be advanced which would explain
how a regulation which forbids James Joyce’s Ulysses, but permits Hugh Hefner’s
Playboy, has a rational relationship to the above-stated goals. Any such argument would
be irrational, if not utterly incomprehensible,”323 Judge Turk opined. As for the security,
safety and rehabilitation interests that prison officials asserted to support the ban,324
Judge Turk wrote:

314

Id.
Id.
316
See supra note 10 (providing background on traditional overbreadth analysis).
317
See Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 565–73 (applying Turner to the facts of the case).
318
See id. at 566 (“These factors have been applied to prison regulations banning sexually explicit material
many times, and courts have often concluded that the challenged regulations are reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.”).
319
Id.
320
Id. at 567.
321
Judge Turk, flashing his own knowledge of literature, wrote that the following books would be
prohibited under the VDOC policy because they include at least one explicit description of a sexual act or
intercourse:
Candide by Voltaire; Brave New World by Aldous Huxley; All the Pretty Horses by Cormac
McCarthy; Droll Stories by HonorÈ de Balzac; Howl and Other Poems by Allen Ginsburg; [The]
Naked Lunch by William S. Burroughs; Tropic of Cancer by Henry Miller; Slaughterhouse Five
by Kurt Vonnegaught; Sophie’s Choice by William Styron; Myra Breckenridge by Gore Vidal;
One Hundred Years of Solitude by Gabriel Garcia Marquez; For Whom the Bell Tolls by Ernest
Hemingway; A Farewell to Arms by Ernest Hemingway; Women in Love by D. H. Lawrence; As I
Lay Dying by William Faulkner; The Handmaid’s Tale by Margaret Atwood; Leaves of Grass and
Song of Myself by Walt Whitman, as well as nearly any novel by John Updike.
Id. at 568 n.4
322
Id. at 571 n. 20.
323
Id. at 567.
324
See supra notes 303–304 and accompanying text (setting forth the reasons asserted by prison officials
for explaining the policy).
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It strains credulity to believe that limiting a prisoner’s access to Lady
Chatterley’s Lover could have any effect on the security, discipline, and
good order of the prison. Likewise, it would be patently incredible to
assert that reading Joyce’s Ulysses will somehow threaten the
rehabilitation of a prisoner. Certainly, VDOC has not provided any
scientific or expert evidence that supports such connections.325
Judge Turk, in perhaps coming as close as possible to judicial ridicule of a
government policy without stepping over the line of professionalism, added:
[I]t is a bizarre interpretation to suggest that an inmate’s possession of
Ulysses would be used for “bartering” or “lead to stealing, fights, assaults
and other disruptive activities.” Particularly with respect to Ulysses it is
impossible to even imagine prison inmates fighting for the chance to delve
into the incredibly difficult to decipher novel, one metaphor-laden scene
of which portrays exhibitionist behavior and masturbation.326
Given such a scathing critique, it was anything but surprising that Judge Turk
concluded that a policy that fails to “discriminate between works such as James Joyce’s
Ulysses and common pornography”327—a plan “permitting Playboy and forbidding
Ulysses”328—simply “does not possess the constitutionally required rational connection
between regulation and the legitimate governmental objective.”329
Turning to the fourth Turner factor—consideration of whether an easy or ready
alternative policy would serve the interest(s) asserted by prison officials without
intruding as much on First Amendment concerns—Judge Turk suggested that a policy
banning only visual depictions of frontal nudity and not prohibiting words would be a
reasonable solution.330 Put differently, an images-versus-words distinction or dichotomy
might well remedy the over inclusiveness of the existing policy. In fact, Judge Turk
stayed the injunction for sixty days to provide VDOC officials time to amend or revise
their policy in such manner to render it constitutional.331
In summary, the VDOC prohibition on sexually explicit content suffered from what
Judge Turk dubbed the “fatal flaw of over inclusiveness.”332 The policy’s expansive
breadth simply undermined the alleged rationales and arguments behind it. Crafting
precise policies that are more narrowly tailored in scope thus should become a priority for
prison officials if they want to squelch speech in a constitutional fashion and not receive
a judicial tongue-lashing.
With the examination of the eight opinions in this Part of the Article in mind, the
authors now turn to an issue raised by a very recent United States Supreme Court ruling
325

Couch, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 569–70.
Id. at 571.
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Id. at 568.
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that arguably could impact the level of proof by which prison officials must demonstrate
that a speech-related product will cause harm behind bars.
III. RELAXED STANDARDS OF CAUSATION AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: SHOULD
BROWN V. ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION AFFECT THE ANALYSIS OF
CONTENT-BASED, BEHIND-BARS CENSORSHIP?
In June 2011, the United States Supreme Court struck down a California statute
designed to shield minors from supposedly dangerous speech, namely violent video
games in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.333 Writing the Opinion of the
Court, Justice Antonin Scalia adopted a rigorous standard that requires proof that speech
must in fact cause harm before it may be censored permissibly.334 Justice Scalia wrote in
Brown that “ambiguous proof will not suffice” and neither will a mere positive
correlation between speech and harm.335 As he put it, the studies offered by California in
Brown “do not prove that violent video games cause minors to act aggressively (which
would at least be a beginning).”336
Given the consistent parallels drawn between the speech rights of minors in public
school settings and the speech rights of adults behind bars,337 one might reasonably
wonder if the ruling in Brown should impact the level of proof that prison officials must
demonstrate before supposedly harmful speech—books, movies, and magazines—may be
censored. For instance, in the case of Singer v. Raemisch,338 should prison officials be
required to prove that either reading about or playing the video game “Dungeons and
Dragons” causes inmates to act like violent gang members? Further, in the case of Starr
v. Moore,339 should prison officials be required to prove that reading books about
acupuncture and qi causes inmates to take the knowledge they gain about body pressure
points and then use it to commit violent acts against other inmates? It will be recalled,
however, from Miskam v. McAllister described above340 that the general rule here is that
“a prison need not show that a banned publication actually caused conflict; the focus is
instead on whether the ban is reasonably related to a penological interest.”341
Unfortunately for free speech advocates, it is not likely that Brown’s analysis of the
proof-of-harm issue will be transported to the realm of prison censorship anytime soon.
That is because Brown was specifically decided under the strict scrutiny standard of
judicial review,342 rather than what closely approximates the rational basis standard of
333

131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011) (concluding that California’s violent video game law “cannot survive strict
scrutiny”).
334
Id. at 2738–39.
335
Id. at 2739. Justice Scalia wrote that the studies offered by California to support its law “show at best
some correlation between exposure to violent entertainment and minuscule real-world effects.” Id.
336
Id.
337
Supra notes 62–64, 204–208, 212, 258–261 and accompanying text (referencing the parallels between
the speech rights of students and inmates).
338
Supra subpart II.A.2.
339
Supra subpart II.B.2.
340
Supra subpart II.B.3.
341
Miskam v. McAllister, No. 2:08-02229 JMS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43146, at *20 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21,
2011).
342
See text accompanying supra note 7 (describing strict scrutiny review).
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review in Equal Protection cases not involving either suspect classes or fundamental
rights343 and that was embraced under Turner in the First Amendment context of inmate
speech.344 The two tests are radically different, both inside and outside of the First
Amendment context.345 Significantly, even when the United States Supreme Court
administers rational basis review in a more demanding, with-teeth fashion, only a
correlation is required between classification and purpose.346
Furthermore, under the Turner framework, judicial “deference not only lightens the
government’s burden of justifying a speech restriction, but actually shifts the burden back
to the speech plaintiff.”347 On the question of proof of harm allegedly caused by speech,
this burden shifting has the rather perverse result of requiring an inmate to demonstrate
lack of causation while assuming that the speech prison officials seek to censor causes
harm. Put more bluntly, the burden on the plaintiff-inmate is to prove a negative. How a
plaintiff behind bars might accomplish this task boggles the mind, even if he or she was a
social scientist capable of designing and performing controlled experiments behind bars.
Thus, unless the Supreme Court abandons the Turner analysis for a strict scrutiny
standard of review when the First Amendment speech rights of inmates are restricted by
content-based regulations on what they may read or watch, it is highly doubtful that the
causation-of-harm requirements from the 2011 ruling in Brown will be applied in the
prison context.

343

Professors John Nowak and Ronald Rotunda describe rational basis review as:
the test used in cases that do not involve a fundamental right and wherein the Court does not find a
classification of persons for whom there should be special protection (such as racial, national
origin, gender or illegitimacy classifications). The rationality test is easy to state: the classification
only has to have a rational relationship to any legitimate government interest in order to comply
with the equal protection guarantee.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 755 (8th ed. 2010).
344
Other legal commentators have drawn the link between rational basis review and the Turner test. See,
e.g., Rose, supra note 57, at 169–70 (referring to the Turner test as “rational basis review”); Ozan O. Varol,
Strict in Theory, But Accommodating in Fact?, 75 MO. L. REV. 1243, 1284 (2010) (writing that “[u]nder
Turner, a prison policy that burdened the inmates’ constitutional rights would be upheld if the policy was
‘reasonably related’ to ‘legitimate penological interests’—similar to rational-basis review) (emphasis
added).
345
As Professor Eva S. Nilsen succinctly explains:
Where other laws invoking mere liberty interests need only be rationally related to any
conceivable legitimate government purpose to survive a due process challenge (rational basis
review), strict scrutiny means that once a right is determined to be fundamental, its deprivation
must be supported by a compelling state interest, and must be narrowly tailored so that no greater
deprivation is inflicted than is necessary to achieve that interest.
Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to Constitutional
Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 170 (2007) (emphasis added).
346
Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational-Basis Review and Same-Sex Relationships, 86 WASH.
L. REV. 281, 290 (2011) (writing that “in those rationality cases where the U.S. Supreme Court has applied
a more demanding standard, it will typically search the record for evidence of a correlation between
classification and purpose, and it will also insist that there actually be such a correlation”) (emphasis
added).
347
See Moss, supra note 212, at 1659 (emphasis added).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Dean Erwin Chemerinsky characterizes the United States Supreme Court as
affording “tremendous deference”348 to the government in the area of prison
administration. Deference, as Professor Paul Horwitz writes, may be defined as “a
decisionmaker’s decision to follow a determination made by some other individual or
institution that it might not otherwise have reached had it decided the same question
independently.”349 Specifically, in cases involving the free speech rights of prisoners, as
with those of students in public school settings, courts engage in what is known as
institutional deference.350 In brief, they defer to the supposedly specialized knowledge
and expertise of those who operate such government institutions.351
The damage wrought to free speech rights by such institutional deference is
compounded by real-world fears and cultural pressures. In particular, just as fears of
future Columbine-like violence have left high school students swimming in a sea of
censorship as judges provide massive deference to school administrators,352 fears of
violence and disruption of security within prisons largely fuel the deference granted to
prison officials by lower court judges. This, in turn, typically renders Turner toothless
when it comes to protecting the First Amendment speech rights of inmates. Perhaps this
is why the type of rigorous application of Turner witnessed in the dissenting opinions of
both Justice John Paul Stevens353 and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg354 in the Supreme
Court’s 2006 opinion in Beard v. Banks355 was evidenced only in two of the eight cases
from 2010 and 2011 examined above, namely the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Hrdlicka v.

348

Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 453
(1999).
349
Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2008).
350
See Moss, supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting the similarities between how prisoners and
public school students are treated under the law when it comes to free speech rights).
351
Professor Gia B. Lee makes this point in a recent law journal article:
A common set of arguments advanced to justify courts’ limited review of speech restrictions
within government institutions or programs stresses the initial decisionmaker’s superior
knowledge or judgment in a particular field. On this view, executive and administrative officials
such as school administrators, prison wardens, and military officials have the relevant experience
and expertise to reach decisions that ensure well-functioning institutions.
Gia B. Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government Institutions and Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1691, 1718 (2009).
352
The specter of violence like the kind caused by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold in April 1999 at
Columbine High School is still evident in judicial decisions more than a decade after that tragedy. See, e.g.,
D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756, 764, (8th Cir. 2011) (involving a student,
D.J.M., who “sent instant messages from his home to a classmate in which he talked about getting a gun
and shooting some other students at school,” and concluding that “[i]n light of [a school district]’s
obligation to ensure the safety of its students and reasonable concerns created by shooting deaths at other
schools such as Columbine,” the trial court correctly ruled that the school district “did not violate the First
Amendment by notifying the police about [student] D.J.M.’s threatening instant messages and subsequently
suspending him after he was placed in juvenile detention”) (emphasis added).
353
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 542–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
354
Id. at 553–56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
355
548 U.S. 521 (2006); see supra Part I (examining the high court’s ruling in Beard).
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Reniff356 and the decision by United States District Judge James Turk out of the Western
District of Virginia in Couch v. Jabe.357
Though it often is rendered toothless when applied by federal appellate and district
court judges,358 this Article makes it clear that Turner certainly is the judicial standard of
choice twenty-five years after it was handed down. The Eighth Amendment standard of
review championed by Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia was adopted in
none of the 2010 and 2011 federal court cases involving the access-to-speech rights of
inmates.359
The bottom line is that unless an inmate’s case involves particularly outrageous
facts or happens to be assigned to a pro-free speech jurist who refuses to grant expansive
deference to prison officials, there is very little hope of a First Amendment triumph under
Turner today. As Part III explained, the question of causation of harm is one particular
aspect of the Turner rational basis approach that greatly harms free speech interests but
that largely could be cured by instantiating into Turner the proof-of-causation approach
embraced by the Supreme Court in Brown in 2011. That result, however, as Part III
explained, is not likely to occur.

356

See supra subpart II.A.4 (examining Hrdlicka).
See supra subpart II.B.4 (examining Couch).
358
The exceptions to overly deferential review under Turner described in this Article are found in Hrdlicka
v. Reniff and Couch v. Jabe described above in subparts II.A.4 and II.B.4, respectively.
359
See supra notes 81–97 and accompanying text (describing the Eighth Amendment standard supported by
Justices Thomas and Scalia).
357
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APPENDIX
Below are the names and brief descriptions of some other federal court decisions
rendered from January 2010 through September 2011 involving the free speech rights of
inmates but not otherwise discussed in this article.
1. Frazier v. Ortiz, 417 Fed. Appx. 768 (10th Cir. 2011) (involving an inmate’s
claim of wrongful denial of access to Rolling Stone, Maxim, and Spin magazines,
and finding no abuse of discretion by a judge who denied the inmate’s motion to
amend because the inmate failed to clear the burden to avoid summary judgment).
2. Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14753 (10th Cir. July 20,
2011) (involving an inmate’s lawsuit against prison officials challenging a ban on
usage of federal funds to distribute commercially published, sexually explicit
materials, and holding the claims were moot because the inmate failed to seek
relief on a system-wide basis rather than against specific individuals at an
institution where he no longer was incarcerated).
3. Kaden v. Slykhuis, 651 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2011) (involving denial of inmate
access to the magazine Shonen Jump due to its allegedly violent content, and
reversing dismissal of the inmate’s case and remanding it for further consideration
of the validity of the prison’s regulation as applied to Shonen Jump because the
inmate’s lawsuit “was dismissed before [prison] officials were required to answer
the complaint, let alone to advance evidence that might help us decipher whether
[the prison’s] decision to apply the violent-prison-mail regulation to this
publication was appropriate, or an exaggerated response to prison concerns”).
4. Parkhurst v. Lampert, 418 Fed. Appx. 712 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of prison officials who refused to deliver unsolicited and bulk
copies of an inmate’s newsletter to prisoners in the Wyoming State Penitentiary).
5. Woods v. Comm’r Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 652 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2011) (involving a
policy prohibiting inmates from advertising for pen-pals and receiving materials
from websites and publications that allow persons to advertise for pen-pals, and
upholding the regulation as reasonably related to the legitimate penological
objective of preventing inmate fraud).
6. Stauffer v. Gearhart, No. H-08-1587, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65624 (S.D. Tex.
July 20, 2011) (rejecting an inmate’s claim of wrongful denial of access to Hot
Rod, Performance Products, and Jeg’s High Performance magazines because
they commonly feature sexually explicit material).
7. Brown v. Gulash, No. 07-cv-370-JPG-PMF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29766 (S.D.
Ill. Mar. 22, 2011) (rejecting prison officials’ motion for summary judgment on a
claim alleging they violated an inmate’s First Amendment speech rights by
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denying access to magazines and books because prison officials failed to offer any
justification for rejecting them).
8. Lucas v. Ozmint, No. 9:10-17-CMC-BM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30353 (D. S.C.
Mar. 22, 2011) (rejecting prison officials’ summary judgment motion regarding
an inmate’s First Amendment claims because defendants provided no evidence
that policies used to reject access to Maxim, GQ, and Sports Illustrated magazines
were related to legitimate penological interests).
9. Jones v. Golden, No. 5:10CV00068 JMM-BD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42565
(E.D. Ark. Mar. 9, 2011) (rejecting inmate’s claim that prison officials wrongfully
denied him access to Angels of Death magazine because it featured gang signs
and violated a prison policy against delivery of material condoning “criminal
activity”).
10. Erler v. Dominguez, No. 2:09-CV-88-TLS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20632 (N.D.
Ind. Feb. 28, 2011) (involving a claim filed by an inmate alleging prison officials
violated his First Amendment speech rights by denying him access to a magazine
because it violated prison policy against delivery of publications containing seminude photographs of women).
11. De Puente-Hudson v. Adams, No. 1:08-cv-01228-OWW-GSA-PC, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16421 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2011) (involving a pro se action against
prison officials for prohibiting and confiscating Maxim, Stuff, and FHM
magazines, and holding the inmate’s First Amendment rights were not violated by
the policy because it satisfied the Turner test).
12. Reynolds v. Rios, No. 1:10-cv-00051-OWW-GBCPC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18588 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011) (dismissing an inmate’s claim targeting denial of
access to publications such as Vanity Fair, W, Esquire, and GQ, but granting a
thirty-day leave to amend his complaint).
13. Glassman v. Yates, No. 1:08-cv-01485-OWW-SKO PC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10075 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2011) (rejecting a prisoner’s claim for access to
magazines including Dungeons and Dragons and The Forgotten Temple of
Tharizdan because they constituted a threat to prison safety and security).
14. Mashaney v. Call, No. 09-3105-JTM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137319 (D. Kan.
Dec. 29, 2010) (rejecting an inmate’s claim that prison officials violated his First
Amendment rights by denying access to Interview magazine because it contained
sexually explicit material in violation of a prison policy).
15. Newsom v. Knight, No. 1:09-cv-1252-JMS-DML, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135513
(S.D. Ind. Dec. 21, 2010) (rejecting an inmate’s claim that prison officials
wrongly denied him access to Slingshot newspaper under a policy prohibiting
access to violent materials and dismissing plaintiff’s claim regarding denial of the
hardcover book Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows because the prison
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officials against whom the inmate filed the claim had no involvement with
enforcing the policy).
16. Davis v. Zavaras, No. 09-cv-00266-REB-BNB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141575
(D. Colo. Nov. 10, 2010) (involving a claim made by a sex-offender inmate that
prison officials violated his First Amendment rights by ordering mailroom staff to
deny him access to magazines such as Playboy, Maxim, National Geographic,
The Picture Pimp, Garden State Periodicals, Fantasy World, and Manga Woman,
as well as the books Real Girls and Fresh Girls; and upholding defendants’
summary judgment motion because confiscation of the publications was related to
legitimate penological interests).
17. Banks v. Ludeman, No. 08-5792 (MJD/JJK), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36711 (D.
Minn. Oct. 4, 2010) (dismissing a sex-offender inmate’s complaint against
Minnesota Department of Human Services officials for denying him access to
Christies New York Photographs catalog because it violated prison policy
prohibiting possession of sexually explicit materials but denying the defendants’
summary judgment motions regarding confiscation of the DVD The Adventure of
Photography: 150 Years of the Photographic Image and the magazine Pacific
Island Ladies, because the defendants provided no evidence how the materials
violated prison policy).
18. Johnson v. Shemonic, No. 10-071-GPM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104446 (S.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 2010) (rejecting plaintiff’s First Amendment claim that prison officials
wrongfully denied him access to magazines under a policy prohibiting sexually
explicit material because such denial was rationally related to legitimate
penological interests).
19. Givens v. Landers, No. 09-cv-00945-PAB-BNB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95072
(D. Colo. Aug. 4, 2010) (dismissing an inmate’s complaint alleging wrongful
denial of access to Curves and Smooth Girl magazines because they contained
photos of women in minimal clothing, violating a policy prohibiting delivery of
sexually explicit materials).
20. Hedgespeth v. Bartow, No. 09-cv-246-slc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76280 (W.D.
Wis. July 27, 2010) (rejecting an inmate’s First Amendment claims regarding
access to video games, gaming systems, CDs, and DVDs because of security
concerns associated with possession and lending of such materials within the
prison system).
21. Hunsaker v. Jimerson, No. 08-cv-01479-REB-MJW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
95546 (D. Colo. July 9, 2010) (involving a sex-offender inmate’s claim that
prison officials wrongfully denied access to Maxim, Sunset, Rolling Stone,
Newsweek, and the Rocky Mountain News under a prison policy the inmate
alleged was unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad, and rejecting the officials’
motion that the claim be summarily dismissed).
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22. Gonzalez v. Mullen, No. C 09-00953 CW (PR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55947
(N.D. Cal. May 14, 2010) (involving an inmate’s claim against prison officials for
denying him access to R-rated movies but dismissing his complaint because the
prison did not enforce the policy and thus the policy had no apparent effect on
him).
23. Espinosa v. Addams, No. 1:09-cv-00760-DLB PC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46177
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2010) (involving an inmate’s claim alleging prison officials
wrongfully denied him access to a Wicca book his family purchased because it
contained nudity, and dismissing his claim because he alleged no facts indicating
officials’ violated his First Amendment rights).
24. Baker v. Holder, No. 06-CV-91-HRW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30560 (E.D. Ky.
Mar. 30, 2010) (holding that a prison policy denying prisoners access to
magazines that contained sexually explicit material did not violate the prisoner’s
First Amendment rights).
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